

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
16 November 2007

Original: English

**Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict
in Myanmar***Summary*

The present report has been prepared in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1612 (2005). It is presented to the Security Council and its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict as the first country report pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 10 of that resolution. The report, which covers the period from July 2005 to September 2007, provides information on the current situation regarding the recruitment and use of children and other grave violations being committed against children affected by armed conflict in the Union of Myanmar. While the monitoring and reporting structures as outlined in the mechanism endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 1612 (2005) are in place, the modalities of an effective mechanism, including security guarantees, access to affected areas and freedom of movement of monitors without Government escort, are lacking. This first report therefore sets forth the general scope of the situation based on the information available to the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting at the present time.

Although there has been progress in terms of dialogue with the Government of Myanmar and two non-State actors, the report notes that State and non-State actors continue to be implicated in grave child rights violations. The Government of Myanmar has made a commitment at the highest level that no child under the age of 18 will be recruited. The Government has set up a high-level Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children and a working group for monitoring and reporting on the same issue. Further, there are Government policies and directives prohibiting underage recruitment. To date, the Government has not acceded to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000). Two non-State actors (the Karen National Union and the Karenni National Progressive Party) have signed Deeds of Commitment to cease the recruitment and use of children, to declare their adherence to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and have committed themselves to appropriate follow-up action.



The Government has committed to bringing its current action plan on the prevention of the recruitment of children into its armed forces, the Tatmadaw Kyi, into line with international standards and to facilitate action plans with the United Wa State Army and other non-State actors. The Government of Myanmar has also recognized the need for the United Nations country task force in Myanmar to engage the Karen National Union and Karenni National Progressive Party in the development of action plans and monitor their compliance in accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). A principal difficulty with regard to monitoring grave violations of children's rights remains the lack of access to some locations of concern. Access to conflict-affected areas is severely restricted by the Government, a situation that impacts greatly on monitoring and possible responses to child rights violations.

I. Introduction

1. The present report, covering the period from July 2005 to September 2007, has been prepared in accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), and describes what is currently known of the situation of children affected by armed conflict in Myanmar. Although a country task force on monitoring and reporting was established in June 2007, United Nations agencies and partners in Myanmar have been constrained by: (a) the lack of full access to conflict-affected areas; (b) the lack of guarantees of protection for child rights and for monitors reporting on grave rights violations; and (c) the absence of a procedure for engagement with the Government of Myanmar on grave rights violations committed by all parties. Consequently, data collection has been very difficult. This first report provides the background and baseline against which any future progress can be measured and focuses on the recruitment and use of child soldiers and other grave violations against children, with a special focus on the denial of humanitarian access to children. The report describes the progress in dialogue with the Government and non-State actors to date and identifies the plans for establishing a fully functional monitoring and reporting mechanism and action plans that meet international standards.

II. Political, military and social developments in Myanmar

2. Myanmar faces challenges in interactions with its many different ethnic groups, many of which have political and armed structures and demand autonomy. Conflict between the State and these groups broke out after independence was achieved in 1948 and has been ongoing in certain border areas of the country. Myanmar is currently governed by the State Peace and Development Council. Elections held in 1990 were never recognized by the military government, despite repeated urging by the General Assembly to do so. In September 2007, the Government of the Union of Myanmar concluded its 14-year constitution-drafting National Convention, an opportunity for dialogue between political actors and ethnic group representatives. However, it appears that the participation of ethnic political parties, many of which are associated with ceasefire groups, has been limited. The Convention is the first step of the Government's "seven-step road map to democracy", which is intended to lead to a constitutional referendum and general elections. The outcome of the Convention remains unclear. The recent peaceful demonstrations by Buddhist monks and members of the general public in a number of locations around the country resulted in a brutal crackdown, including arbitrary beatings, killings and arrests by security forces.

3. In the 1990s, the Tatmadaw Kyi, the national army, negotiated ceasefire agreements with most of the ethnic armed groups. There are reports of the continued existence of distinct armed groups in the ceasefire areas. Currently, three major non-State groups, namely the Karen National Union (KNA) (armed wing: Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)); the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) (armed wing: Karenni Army (KA)); and the Shan State Army-South remain in active conflict with Government forces. Others have concluded ceasefire agreements individually brokered with the Government of Myanmar. Many of these groups still hold arms, most significantly the Kachin Independence Organization (armed wing: Kachin Independence Army) and the United Wa State Party (armed wing: United Wa State Army).

4. Myanmar continues to experience accelerating impoverishment and the impaired ability of social service provision structures to address the essential needs of the general population, especially children. A recent household survey of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),¹ conducted in collaboration with the Central Statistics Office, revealed that more than 30 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. A recent increase of 15 to 20 per cent in food prices has had a serious effect on the rural poor, whose expenditures on food comprise 76 per cent of the total consumption budget.¹ Under-five and infant mortality rates remain high at 107 and 76 per 1,000 live births, respectively.² Maternal mortality rates are estimated at 316 per 100,000 live births. School enrolment rates are high, yet only 43 per cent of the children who enrol actually complete the primary cycle, because of the cost of schooling, poor conditions in many schools, language barriers, and a shortage of qualified teachers and learning materials. Awareness of child protection issues has increased in recent years, especially about areas of particular concern including child trafficking, commercial sexual exploitation of children and juvenile justice and, to a lesser extent, underage recruitment. However, reliable data on the current child protection situation remains mostly episodic and anecdotal; further investigation of the scope of the issues is needed. Although the aid community has expanded its geographical reach, and United Nations agencies and several international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are present in a number of states, divisions and townships enabling delivery of a range of programmes and services to people in need, vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas, including areas of Kayin and Kayah states along the Thai border and parts of Shan state, remain out of reach due to restricted access.

III. Grave violations of children's rights

5. The country task force on monitoring and reporting has set up a monitoring and reporting mechanism as outlined under Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). As the mechanism is in its early stages, this first country annual report provides only a cursory overview. Due to limited access to conflict-affected areas and the lack of guaranteed protection for monitors and victims of grave child rights violations, it is not possible currently to provide a full picture of the breadth and depth of grave child rights violations. This report, based on the limited information currently available to the task force, describes the situation of violations by a range of armed forces and groups based on confirmed information and observations.

Recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups

6. The country task force has received numerous credible reports about violations of international humanitarian law, human rights law and Myanmar military directives,³ resulting in the recruitment and use of children by some Government military units and several non-State actors. Although specific verified cases are few

¹ UNDP/Central Statistics Office Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment.

² UNICEF Executive Board, Country Programme Document, 2005.

³ Myanmar Defence Council Directive No. 13/73, *Regulation for military recruitment* (8 April 1974), stipulates that "A candidate for the Military Services shall meet the following qualifications: Must be 18 years old and not older than 25 years." In Defence Council Directive No. 8/75, *Relaxation of age limitation for military service in the Tatmadaw* (25 September 1975), the maximum age is extended to 35 years, while the minimum age is maintained at 18 years.

for the aforementioned reasons, there are extensive reports of children sighted in uniform, sometimes armed, riding in trucks, and marching and participating in military trainings or parades, which corroborate individual reports and point to a worrisome trend. These reports implicate the Tatmadaw and a number of non-State armed groups.

Tatmadaw Kyi

7. Myanmar Defence Council directives explicitly prohibit the recruitment of children under the age of 18 into the Tatmadaw Kyi (Tatmadaw). The Government has shown increasing interest in addressing underage recruitment and has engaged the United Nations on the issue. Myanmar's five year national plan of action to combat human trafficking (2007-2011), for example, includes measures to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers. The Government has produced a poster designed to raise awareness on recruitment criteria, including a description of minimum age requirements.

8. The Government is responsible for the enforcement of its policies and laws, including Defence Council directives, the Myanmar Child Law, and international commitments to which Myanmar is a State party, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 29. While the Government has reported that officers have been disciplined for underage recruitment, individual officers or battalions that violate the law are not consistently held accountable. The United Nations country team is largely unable to verify Government claims that those responsible for underage recruitment have been disciplined or prosecuted, save under the ILO Convention 29 supplementary agreement procedures. Indeed, one such case is currently under review and a decision is pending as to what action, if any, the Government intends to take.

9. Despite the Government policy of prohibiting the recruitment of children under the age of 18, it is important to note the following incidents and trends.

- There is reportedly enormous pressure to accelerate Tatmadaw recruitment rates. Recruitment centres have had difficulty meeting their targets/quotas. Incentives such as money and rice are offered for maintaining recruitment targets. If a soldier wants to leave the army, reportedly, he must recruit as many as four replacements.
- There are several common patterns of underage recruitment into the Tatmadaw. One is recruitment from the street or from pagodas⁴ of poor and unaccompanied children who are vulnerable to promises of food and shelter. This has been reported primarily in Yangon and Mandalay, and increasingly in rural areas. Other children are recruited from the street by "brokers", self-appointed agents with ties to local commanders and/or recruitment officers. Brokers can receive up to K40,000 (approximately US\$ 30) and a bag of rice from local commanders for each new recruit.
- Some children⁵ picked up by police for not having a national identification card are offered the "choice" of either being arrested or going into the army. In

⁴ In Myanmar, pagodas are Buddhist places of worship.

⁵ Under the Myanmar Child Law, a child is "a person who has not attained the age of 16 years". A person who is between the ages of 16 and 18 years old is considered a "youth" under the Child Law. For purposes of this report, "child" refers to people under the age of 18.

October 2005, a 15-year-old was arrested by Myanmar police in Ayeyawady Division for not having an identification card and was taken to a military centre in Yangon. After military training, he was sent to the front line in Kayin state. In 2006, he fled to a refugee camp in the border area.

- Credible sources indicate a pattern of "pre-recruitment" in which children from vulnerable families are taken to Tatmadaw bases. They are not officially recruited, do not receive identification numbers and are used in non-combatant capacities. Once they attain the age of majority, they are subsequently enlisted.

10. A related challenge is age verification. The birth registration undertaken as part of the national vital registration system does not always provide vulnerable children in remote areas with birth certificates. The responsibility for establishing the age of the recruit lays with the recruiting party, not with the child or his/her parent or guardian. Children without a birth certificate or national identity card are at higher risk of recruitment, as there is little attempt at age verification by Tatmadaw recruiters.

11. Also of grave concern are the reliable reports of a number of incarcerated children/minors who have been convicted of desertion and sentenced to prison terms of up to five years. International practice and principles stipulate that children who have been unlawfully recruited or used by armed forces should not be treated as deserters. As children cannot legally serve in the military, deeming them deserters is not a legitimate claim. Yet, the threat of incarceration for desertion is such that children formerly associated with the Tatmadaw in refugee camps along the eastern Myanmar border areas are reportedly too afraid of being jailed for desertion to return to Myanmar.

12. Seven cases of child recruitment were reported to ILO after the Supplementary Understanding on forced labour became operational in February 2007. That number, however, does not reflect the scale of the problem. Constraints include a lack of awareness about the right to complaint, logistical difficulties in lodging a complaint and a general fear of reprisal, notwithstanding protection assurances. All seven of the children recruited were boys between the ages of 12 and 16.⁶ Some "volunteered" for the army and their parents sought to have them released. One boy used a broker after unsuccessfully attempting to join voluntarily. In several instances, children were recruited by soldiers or policemen from the street. Three of the children have been returned to their parents/guardians. In four cases, ILO is still awaiting Government response. In five cases, ILO is still awaiting information on the outcome of military investigations. In all cases, it is clear that, notwithstanding the military directives on minimum recruitment age, oversight of the recruitment process is lacking.

13. The following verified cases about children in the Government forces were also reported, in addition to those recorded by ILO. Late in 2006, a Tatmadaw corporal visited a village in Ayeyawady Division. A 13-year-old boy guided him to the main road. The corporal promised the boy a good job and persuaded him to leave his village. When the family realized that the boy had disappeared, they made extensive efforts to determine his whereabouts and finally found him at Inn Daing Recruitment Centre. Seeking the boy's release, the parents wrote to Defence

⁶ Data reflects cases registered between February and September 2007. New cases have been registered by ILO since that time.

Minister Than Shwe and General Thein Sein, sending a copy of their family registration document, and letters from the school headmaster and the village authorities. In January 2007, the boy was returned home by an army sergeant, who summoned the village authorities, including the local Peace and Development Council Chairman, and explained that the boy had been released because national policies prohibit underage recruitment. He stated that disciplinary action would be taken against the corporal. The country task force on monitoring and reporting has not been able to verify the charges and outcome of this case to date.

14. A 12-year-old boy from the Yangon slums was approached in a pagoda by a man who offered him lunch. It is possible that the boy was drugged, though this has not been confirmed, as the next thing he recalled was waking up in a car crossing a river. He awoke again later at an army base. He escaped to a nearby village, where the community helped him return to Yangon, where he was reunited with his mother.

15. A 17-year-old male voluntarily joined the army and was trained for four months. He was tasked with troop support. In April 2005, he fled to a refugee camp in the border region.

United Wa State Army

16. The Wa Special Region is isolated geographically and socio-economically from the rest of Myanmar. The Wa authorities have had little or no exposure to international child rights standards. The actual recruitment practices are secret, though reportedly there is a quota principle of one son per family. The United Wa State Army is estimated to have a strength of 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers. Although the actual number of children associated with the United Wa State Army is unknown, credible reports indicate the visible presence of uniformed and armed children in the Wa State Army.

17. During the mission of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict to Myanmar in June 2007, she met with authorities of the United Wa State Army who asserted that they had not recruited children since the ceasefire agreement with the Government of Myanmar. Eyewitness reports of children as young as nine years old in the ranks at Wa military training schools do not, however, bear this out. It has been reported that the Wa primary school curriculum includes pre-military training. At the age of 12, children can join the Wa Army and work in non-combatant positions; at the age of 15, children can join as combatants.

Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army and the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army

18. The United Nations has not received reports in 2007 of recruitment and use of children by KNU/KNLA and KNPP/KA. The Government's denial of access to areas in which these armed groups operate is a major obstacle to the collection and verification of data and reports received. The United Nations received reports of child recruitment earlier in the reporting period (2005-2006), with indications that some children are recruited from inside refugee camps. These reports indicate that children are recruited for future use by KNPP/KA, whereby the children are called for active duty if and when they are needed.

19. The following verified case is illustrative of KNU/KNLA recruitment: In 2005, two KNU/KNLA children visited a refugee camp with other KNU soldiers. One of

the boys, who was 15 years old at the time, had joined KNLA in April 2004, when he was 14. According to the boy, there were 30 to 40 people in his group and 4 or 5 of them were reportedly under the age of 18. He was responsible for domestic duties for officers. On the way to a refugee camp in the border region, he met his KNLA brigade commander, who told him to go back to the village because he was too young to join the army.

Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army

20. This ceasefire organization active in Kachin state claims to have a policy prohibiting the recruitment of children under the age of 18. There are reports, however, of a one-child-per-family quota system for recruitment, notwithstanding the age of the child. In many communities of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), some families apparently accept the "contribution" of one child to the Army as their obligation. Other families send their children away to school, if they can afford to do so, to protect them from recruitment.

21. Early in 2007, a 15-year-old girl was recruited when she returned to her home village from her school in Myitkyina in Kachin state. The girl's family had not "contributed" a child to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Her brother and sister were no longer living in the village, and the girl was targeted as the sole remaining child in the household. To date, the girl remains in the "custody" of KIA.

22. Since signing a ceasefire agreement with the Government of Myanmar, KIO has created its own local government structure and is endeavouring to build and empower its staff and communities. The country task force on monitoring and reporting was informed that KIO/KIA provides education for children in its ranks: girls are trained for teaching, nursing, midwifery, or administrative office functions, while boys are channelled into military training. The association of both boys and girls with KIA is in contravention to applicable national and international law and guidelines.

Karenni National People's Liberation Front

23. The Karenni National People's Liberation Front, a ceasefire group, has a reputation for having many children in its ranks. Children have reportedly been used to search for landmines laid by other armed groups. It has not been possible for the United Nations to verify these reports in any detail.

Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

24. The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, a breakaway faction of KNU/KNLA active in Kayin state, remains heavily armed and reportedly has children in its ranks. The United Nations has received credible reports that indicate the presence of uniformed and armed children in and near Democratic Karen Buddhist Army camps, including some children who had previously been recruited and released by KNU.

Shan State Army-South and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army

25. There are reports of frequent sightings of children being forcibly taken and used by armed groups in Shan state. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang) in northern Shan state reportedly allows even very young children to bear arms. There are also reports that the Shan State Army-South recruited

children in 2007 as part of a new mandatory recruitment policy. However, as monitors have not been granted access to conflict-affected areas of Shan state, comprehensive information on recruitment and use by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and Shan State Army-South remains incomplete and is a priority area for increased monitoring activities.

Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council

26. There are reports from several sources indicating that the KNU/KNLA Peace Council, a breakaway faction of KNU currently active in Kayin state, has recruited children from a refugee camp and from villages in the border areas in early 2007 (February-March). Sources suggest that nine males, at least five of whom were children between the ages of 13 and 17, were deceived into crossing the border by promises of pay and participation in celebrations, but were subsequently coerced into joining the armed group. While some of the children have returned, four boys are reportedly still missing and assumed active with the KNU/KNLA Peace Council.

Denial of humanitarian access

27. Humanitarian organizations engage with all actors in order to provide immediate relief without regard for political considerations. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people, many of whom are children, in conflict-affected areas continues to be very limited at present, however, owing to restrictive Government policies governing access to both ceasefire and non-ceasefire armed groups. The Government of Myanmar cites safety concerns for its refusal to allow access to conflict-affected areas and "mixed administrative areas".⁷

28. The United Nations agencies and other humanitarian organizations in Myanmar have consistently sought humanitarian access to the conflict-affected areas of Shan, Kayah and Kayin states. In fact, during the first half of 2007, some United Nations agencies that had earlier enjoyed limited access to certain areas of the country in order to implement their programmes have experienced tighter restrictions. The current situation is often unpredictable and can depend on regional commanders or other factors such as unspecified security issues at the time of travel. Until recently, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided critical protection and assistance activities in conflict areas. In the first half of 2007, ICRC closed down three of its five field offices, and it no longer carries out activities in conflict areas. ICRC is also no longer allowed independent access to prisons for monitoring and protection, including for children. Visits to detention facilities stopped at the end of 2005; the organization could not resume these visits. There is still no agreement about its future operational activities.

29. At the beginning of 2006, the Government issued new guidelines⁸ requiring a range of additional authorizations, permits and registration processes, among them a requirement for Government approval of all hires (national and international), which is not in line with international practice and is in contravention to the humanitarian principle of independence. If enforced, the guidelines would further limit

⁷ Mixed administration areas refer to locations that are under the authority of more than one governing entity.

⁸ The Ministries of National Planning and Economic Development and Foreign Affairs led the Government guidelines process.

humanitarian interventions, and humanitarian organizations have expressed grave concerns about this narrowing of humanitarian space. Some organizations attempt to follow their mandate within these limited programmatic or geographic parameters, while others, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, France, have left Myanmar altogether.

30. In July 2006, the UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner for Operations met with officials of the Government of Myanmar and raised the issue of humanitarian access. She proposed an inter-agency assessment on humanitarian needs in conflict areas. At that time, the Government declined on grounds of security. Despite follow-up requests by UNHCR, this proposal has gone unanswered to date.

31. During his August 2006 visit, the Deputy Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) also stressed the need for humanitarian access. He sought support from Secretary 1 Lieutenant General Thein Sein to facilitate the movement of vaccine supplies, cold chain equipment and staff to ensure the immunization of all children throughout Myanmar in connection with the Mass Measles Campaign. In the end, Government vaccinators were allowed access to ceasefire and conflict areas in Kachin, northern Shan and Kayin states.

32. The issue of access was also raised by the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs during her visit in April 2007. During meetings with Government officials, the issue of access was raised in connection with humanitarian concerns in the country, including child mortality and malnutrition. During her visit, the Assistant Secretary-General proposed that the Government create a high-level committee to address humanitarian priorities at the policy level and to act as a focal interlocutor for United Nations engagement on expanding humanitarian space and accessing vulnerable areas, especially conflict-affected areas. Issues of humanitarian access were also raised by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs during his visits in May and October 2006.

33. During the visit of my Special Representative, the Minister for National Planning and Economic Development, U Soe Tha, pledged that the Government would facilitate humanitarian access and operations in these affected areas. However, there has been no change to date.

Killing and maiming of children

34. Populations, including children, in a number of areas continue to suffer from the effects of landmine contamination. Myanmar has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. According to information provided to the United Nations, the Government and several non-State actors manufacture and use landmines extensively, particularly in areas bordering Thailand, India and Bangladesh. Reports indicate that landmines continue to be used widely in Kayin, Kayah and Shan states. There are no mine-clearance programmes and only limited support for landmine victims. Thousands of displaced people have fled their homes as a result of landmines in or near villages and fields.

35. ICRC maintains a programme supporting medical centres, providing free prosthetic treatment at these centres. During 2006, ICRC provided 1,741 prostheses for mine victims.

36. The United Nations has received credible reports indicating that during the period 2006-2007 Government armed forces in Kayin state attacked villagers, as well as their homes, farms, areas of refuge and food stores. As a result of such reported attacks, children have died or sustained serious injuries. These reports, however, cannot be confirmed owing to lack of access to conflict-affected areas.

Attacks on schools and hospitals

37. As the United Nations has very limited access to conflict-affected areas, there have been no confirmed reports of attacks against schools and hospitals during the reporting period.

Abduction of children

38. As the United Nations has very limited access to conflict-affected areas, there have been no confirmed reports of abduction of children during the reporting period.

Rape or other forms of grave sexual violence

39. The United Nations has received credible but unverified reports of rape perpetrated by Government forces and armed groups, which the country task force on monitoring and reporting is not in a position to confirm owing to limited access to conflict-affected areas.

IV. Dialogue and action plans to redress violations of children's rights

Progress on dialogue and action plans with the Government of Myanmar

40. Although the signature and ratification of the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict are pending, Myanmar national laws and directives stipulate that 18 is the minimum recruitment age for the Government armed forces. In January 2004, the Government agreed to cooperate with UNICEF on measures to prevent underage recruitment and to support reintegration of minors identified and released from military service, including improvement of birth and family registration systems to ensure age verification and raise awareness among recruiters about the minimum recruitment age of 18 and other child protection concerns. The Government of Myanmar also agreed to UNICEF education, family and community reintegration interventions for children concerned.

41. Early in 2004, the Government of Myanmar established the high-level Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children, chaired by Lieutenant General Thein Sein (then Secretary 2 of the State Peace and Development Council), comprising the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, and Labour, together with the Judge-Advocate General, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Deputy Attorney-General and the Vice-Chief of Armed Forces Training of the Ministry of Defence. The Committee objectives are to prevent the recruitment of children and to ensure adherence to orders protecting children. The high-level Committee also set up an internal government task force to ensure the enforcement of relevant laws and the prevention of underage recruitment. The task force outlined a plan of action for the implementation of the objectives of

the Committee, which was approved by the Committee in October 2004. The action plan addresses the principal areas of concern with respect to the recruitment, the release and the reintegration of children, public awareness, and cooperation with international organizations. In addition, the action plan authorizes effective action against transgressors of recruitment policies, although the disciplinary action envisaged is not clear. Lists naming alleged child recruiters and their sentences, current as of September 2007, have been provided to the United Nations by the Government, but the country task force on monitoring and reporting does not have access to the alleged perpetrators or documents that would confirm the information.

42. Communication and dialogue on the issue of children and armed conflict over the past four years have become increasingly frequent and include:

- Visits by the United Nations Resident Coordinator and UNICEF to Tatmadaw recruitment centres outside of Yangon and Mandalay in March and August 2004, October 2006 and February 2007. The February visit included an update on the activities of the Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children.
- In August 2006, the Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF met with Secretary 1 Lieutenant General Thein Sein to discuss Government action on the prevention of the recruitment of children into the military and reintegration.
- In October 2006, the United Nations Resident Coordinator and UNICEF Representative were invited to discuss the Myanmar component of the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict with the Deputy Director-General for International Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- In April 2007, UNICEF was invited to conduct a training session during a training course for military recruitment officers, which covered child rights, child protection and relevant international human rights and humanitarian law standards on children affected by armed conflict.
- In June 2007 my Special Representative visited Myanmar, at the invitation of the Government. During her visit, she met with acting Prime Minister and Secretary 1 of the State Peace and Development Council. The Government agreed to the establishment of the monitoring and reporting mechanism within the framework of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). Members of her delegation, accompanied by members of the United Nations country team, met with underage persons discharged and presented by the Tatmadaw Kyi.
- In September 2007, the Department of Social Welfare asked to discuss with the United Nations country team the implementation of the Government action plan and the establishment of a subcommittee on the reintegration of children, as a follow-up to commitments agreed with my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict during her visit in June. On 28 September 2007, a meeting was held in Nay Pyi Taw with representatives from the Office of the Special Representative and the United Nations country team, during which the follow-up developments of the Government were discussed.
- Also in September 2007, the Department of Social Welfare requested assistance from UNICEF to conduct further training on international

humanitarian law, child law, child rights and child protection with military recruitment officers.

- With respect to forced labour, in February 2007, a negotiated complaints procedure was finally agreed to as a Supplementary Understanding to the ILO memorandum of understanding of 2002. This procedure enables victims of forced labour, including child recruitment, to seek redress under ILO Convention 29.

43. Notably, in late September 2007, the Government established a working group for the monitoring and reporting mechanism on the prevention of military recruitment of underage children. This technical working group, chaired by the Director General of the International Organizations and Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will, inter alia, interact with the country task force on monitoring and reporting, conduct training on relevant laws and conventions, and submit allegations of recruitment of children to the authorities concerned.

44. While interactions on child recruitment between the Government and the United Nations have continued, sometimes at the initiative of the Government, to date cooperation on concrete action remains very limited. Since 2005, the United Nations country team has received periodic updates from the Government of Myanmar on the activities of the Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children. In the first six months of 2007, the Government of Myanmar submitted four reports setting forth the Committee awareness-raising and educational activities addressing the issue of child recruitment among army personnel. Recently, the reports have included information on children released from military service and the names of officers disciplined for underage recruitment in violation of the Myanmar Defence Council directives and national policy. Thus far, there has been no method by which the United Nations could confirm either the awareness-raising activities, the disciplinary actions taken or the actual release of children. To date, the United Nations country team has not been able to access or assist any children that the Government of Myanmar claims to have formally separated from the Tatmadaw.

45. During her visit, my Special Representative urged the Government to take disciplinary actions against parties and individuals implicated in grave child rights violations. She received a commitment from the Government that an annotated list of disciplined army personnel and discharged minors with their addresses would be provided. Although the lists have been supplied, they do not include the addresses of the released children. While it is commendable that the Government has provided a list regarding disciplinary action, it is necessary, to ensure transparency and accountability and enable verification, for the Government to share additional information with the United Nations country team.

46. The need to update the Tatmadaw Kyi action plan and bring it into line with international standards was raised by my Special Representative during her visit. The Government agreed in principle, and in September 2007 representatives from the Office of the Special Representative and the United Nations country team were informed at a meeting in Nay Pyi Taw that the action plan would be brought into line with the Paris Commitments in the near future.

47. Components of a revised action plan should include:

- More regular interaction between the United Nations country team/country task force and the Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children regarding the Committee's work
- Engagement with the United Nations country team/country task force to ensure conformity of the action plan with international practice and to assist with the implementation of policies
- Identification of a focal point within the military, in addition to the focal points identified in the Department of Social Welfare and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Intensified public awareness campaign on the rules and regulations governing recruitment
- Immediate release of all children being used by armed forces or groups
- Engagement with the United Nations country team/country task force to address the reintegration of children released from the Tatmadaw Kyi and other armed groups, as agreed by the Government of Myanmar and my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict
- A transparent reporting procedure for victims and families with guaranteed protections from reprisals
- Transparent and accountable disciplinary procedures for all persons, military or civilian, who violate recruitment rules and regulations
- Access to children separated from armed forces and groups for effective reintegration follow-up
- Access to all areas where recruitment is alleged for immediate follow-up by the country task force on monitoring and reporting.

Progress on dialogue and action plans with non-State actors

48. The principal issue impeding dialogue with non-State actors who remain in conflict with the Government military is the restrictive stance of the Government regarding engagement by the United Nations with these armed groups. This position was conveyed in a series of letters from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations, Kyaw Tint Swe, sent to the UNICEF Executive Director and the UNDP Administrator in late 2006 expressing concern about a meeting between United Nations staff members and KNU and KNLA regarding action plans for the separation of children from their forces. The respective United Nations responses stressed that the meetings were in line with the dialogue the United Nations has undertaken to follow up on the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005), regarding the drafting of action plans to halt the recruitment and use of children by all parties to conflict. It further highlighted that such interaction is consistent with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on children and armed conflict. During the visit of my Special Representative, there was general agreement with Secretary 1 Lieutenant General Thein Sein that further discussions would be undertaken to finalize arrangements for the United Nations country team to engage KNU and KNPP on action plans to cease the recruitment and use of children.

49. To date, United Nations agencies and international NGOs in Myanmar have been denied access to engage with those non-State actors remaining in conflict, despite the fact that such engagement would confer neither legitimacy nor legality upon the armed groups. Rather, such access to the non-State actors would enable United Nations agencies and protection partners to fulfil their mandates to halt the recruitment and use of children by armed groups and to provide assistance to vulnerable populations.

50. Despite limited dialogue with KNU and KNPP, some progress is being made. The listing of KNU and KNPP in the report of the Secretary-General of 2005 (S/2005/72) and interaction with the United Nations has resulted in KNU and KNPP signing two separate Deeds of Commitment to halt and prevent the recruitment and use of children, signed on 6 April 2007 and 13 April 2007, respectively. These deeds also commit the parties to allow independent monitoring of violations, the release of children from their ranks and the provision of appropriate reintegration assistance by United Nations agencies and NGOs for the released children.

51. In line with this commitment, the country task force on monitoring and reporting in Myanmar will undertake discussion with KNU/KNPP and other relevant parties in order to finalize an action plan to cease the recruitment and use of children in the border areas. This will be done with support from the appropriate partners in the border areas.

52. During her visit, my Special Representative met with a representative of the United Wa State Army, who stated that since entering into the ceasefire agreement with the Government, the Wa armed forces are no longer engaged in combat and no longer recruit children. The Special Representative explained to the officials that, to be removed from the agenda of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, they must develop and implement an action plan for the release and reintegration of the children associated with the Wa forces. The Wa representative expressed willingness to engage with UNICEF about the modalities of an action plan. Consequently, in July 2007 the UNICEF Representative sought the assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in facilitating a meeting with the Wa authorities. In September, the country task force on monitoring and reporting met with representatives of United Wa State Army to arrange modalities for an initial joint assessment visit by the country task force to Northern Shan state at the earliest possible time. This was welcomed by the Wa representatives, and a formal invitation was promised by 15 October 2007, to be facilitated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the invitation has not been sent to date.

V. Establishment of the monitoring and reporting mechanism

53. While dialogue on general aspects of the prevention of child recruitment has increased over the past four years, dialogue on the establishment of a formal monitoring and reporting mechanism was launched only recently during the visit of my Special Representative to Myanmar in June 2007. The stated purpose of her visit was twofold: first, to establish a country task force on monitoring and reporting, and second, to discuss monitoring and reporting modalities with the Government of Myanmar, the United Nations country team and child protection partners. During her visit, the Special Representative made clear to the Government that the reporting would be undertaken by the United Nations country team, which would share

information with the Government with respect to reports of grave child rights violations and would necessarily expect the Government and other relevant parties to also take action on information with respect to such violations. The Government agreed that the United Nations would set up a monitoring and reporting task force and mechanism within the framework of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005).

54. The Special Representative informed the Government that monitoring and reporting will cover all six grave violations perpetrated against children under Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). As the monitoring and reporting mechanism will demand high-level interaction with the Government, the Special Representative requested that a focal point be identified for regular exchange and engagement with the United Nations country team and its monitoring and reporting mechanism staff. Acting Prime Minister and Secretary 1 Lieutenant General Thein Sein appointed the Director-General of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement to be the Government focal point on matters relating to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005). In August, the Government informed UNICEF that the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been appointed as a second focal point for this task. In addition, a military focal point is necessary to interact with the country task force on monitoring and reporting on technical aspects regarding the prevention of recruitment and use by the Tatmadaw Kyi and other relevant armed groups.

55. The Government was further informed by my Special Representative that the United Nations country team intends to appoint a full-time international officer under the Office of the Resident Coordinator, to coordinate monitoring and reporting efforts and to liaise with the Government. The Special Representative communicated her concerns to the Government that the effective functioning of the monitoring and reporting mechanism in Myanmar would require access to conflict-affected areas and to other areas where a ceasefire may be in effect, including the Wa Special Region. She stated that travel authorization requirements and Government policies requiring that officials accompany United Nations staff on field visits are inadequate to the needs for independent monitoring and verification central to the Security Council resolution monitoring and reporting practice.

56. A number of important decisions were made towards the establishment of a monitoring and reporting mechanism in the initial period following the visit of the Special Representative, including:

- A Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting was established
- Appropriate member organizations were identified
- The Government was apprised of the creation and purpose of the country task force on monitoring and reporting.

57. In line with the monitoring and reporting mechanism guidelines endorsed by the Security Council (see S/2005/72), the country task force on monitoring and reporting, comprising United Nations agencies and child protection actors, is the main coordination structure for the monitoring and reporting mechanism. The country task force is co-chaired by the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and UNICEF.

58. A fully functional monitoring and reporting mechanism will require at least five international staff and two international interpreters; the granting of entry visas for those staff, and Government guarantees that no retaliatory action will be taken against witnesses of grave child rights violations and people who gather information for the monitoring and reporting mechanism. The staff of the monitoring and reporting mechanism must also have free and confidential access to relevant people and areas, which must include timely freedom to travel for the purpose of verifying information without the presence of Government officers. Furthermore, the staff will need to have access to verify that no retaliatory action has been taken against people making reports, as well as access to any existing documentation relating to the cases. They will also need regular interaction with non-State actors to ensure accountability, which will require the Government of Myanmar to allow access to these actors, particularly in conflict areas.

VI. Programmatic response

59. The United Nations country team, in coordination with the Government of Myanmar, undertook the following programmatic responses for affected children in the reporting period:

- Members of the country task force on monitoring and reporting have ongoing training programmes on child rights, child protection, juvenile justice, family tracing and reintegration, child participation, anti-trafficking, and child protection in emergencies, for Government officials (including police, judges, prison personnel, law officers, social welfare officers and General Administration Department officers), the United Nations and international NGOs.
- Members of the country task force have collaborated with national NGOs, community-based organizations and the Department of Social Welfare to conduct training workshops on child rights and protection for community members, members of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and community leaders. Information, education and communication materials have been developed to support all these training workshops.
- UNICEF, Save the Children and other protection partners are supporting and building the capacity of community-based organizations in preventing and responding to child protection issues and child rights violations.
- In April 2007, UNICEF trained military recruitment officers on child rights, protection, humanitarian law and international obligations related to children and armed conflict.
- Mine-risk education was conducted by international organizations, but had to cease in 2006 because of lack of access to relevant areas.

VII. Recommendations

60. The Government of Myanmar is encouraged to accede at the earliest opportunity to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on

the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000) and to adjust national legislation accordingly.

61. The Government of Myanmar is urged to allow international and humanitarian organizations access for delivery of humanitarian services, including to all affected areas, and to accept the proposal of the UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner for Operations for an inter-agency humanitarian needs assessment. The proposal made by my Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs regarding the creation of a high-level committee to address humanitarian priorities at the policy level should be further pursued, and the United Nations stands ready to assist.

62. The Government of Myanmar should cease the arrest of children, under the age of 18, for desertion, and allow access to an independent international organization to monitor such cases and to ensure swift release.

63. The Government of Myanmar should develop a demining programme and a broad mine-risk education initiative in mine-affected areas. To this end, the United Nations country team is ready to support the Government and to involve international organizations with expertise in mine-risk education with appropriate programming.

64. It is recommended that the Government of Myanmar initiate immediately a comprehensive education and awareness-raising campaign for the Tatmadaw Kyi, particularly regional commanders and military recruiters, at the national and local levels, with support from the United Nations country team. The campaign should direct military personnel to refuse the recruitment of children, and instruct them on the investigation, prosecution and disciplinary actions that will be undertaken for recruitment violations.

65. The Government of Myanmar is encouraged to establish and train child protection units within its ranks at the national and regional levels, and to give these units the authority and capacity to train and oversee compliance with relevant military directives and national law within the Tatmadaw Kyi.

66. It is important that the United Nations country team and protection partners expand existing programmes and capacity to address the release and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed forces or armed groups. These programmes should include family tracing, reintegration and systematic follow-up for all cases.

Monitoring and reporting

67. It is recommended that the Government of Myanmar nominate a military focal point for day-to-day interaction on the implementation of an agreed action plan with UNICEF, the United Nations country team and child protection actors for the immediate release and reintegration of children associated with armed forces and groups in Myanmar.

68. The Government of Myanmar and ILO need to continue their cooperation under the Supplementary Understanding of February 2007, which encompasses a mechanism to eradicate all forms of forced labour, including child soldiers.

69. The Government of Myanmar is urged to facilitate and cooperate with United Nations efforts, through the provision of visas, in-country travel authorizations, unhindered access, confidentiality and security. Guarantees of security for victims,

monitors and individuals reporting cases and information should be codified and jointly signed by the United Nations country team and the Government of Myanmar.

70. The Government of Myanmar is encouraged to respect and allow the immediate engagement of the United Nations country team with KNU and KNPP to enable monitoring, verify allegations and ensure accountability regarding the recruitment and use of children.

71. The Government of Myanmar is urged to remove restrictions on United Nations access to all non-State actors and conflict areas, and to allow regular access to recruitment centres and military bases by staff of the monitoring and reporting mechanism in order to monitor and verify the absence of children under the age of 18.

Action plans

72. The Government of Myanmar should take into account its responsibilities to ensure that all armed groups with which it shares a ceasefire accord are made accessible to staff of the monitoring and reporting mechanism and, should they be found to recruit and utilize child soldiers, to enter into an action plan with the country task force on monitoring and reporting, under the auspices of the Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children with immediate effect.

73. The Government of Myanmar should continue to take disciplinary action against the persons or groups responsible for aiding and abetting the recruitment of children (including the "pre-recruitment" and use of children for work on military bases), and is urged to systematize and institutionalize this disciplinary process. To this end, the disciplinary process should be open and transparent, allowing for independent verification by the monitoring and reporting mechanism.

74. The Wa State Army must immediately enter into dialogue with the country task force on monitoring and reporting and child protection partners to devise an action plan on ceasing the recruitment of children and to ensure their immediate release for reintegration and follow-up by UNICEF and its child protection partners, and to allow free access to monitoring partners for verification purposes, as agreed with my Special Representative on Children and Armed conflict during her visit in June 2007.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
13 November 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 13 November 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 28 September 2007 (S/2007/575), informing you of the appointment, for a period of six months, of four experts to serve on the Monitoring Group on Somalia re-established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1766 (2007).

I was subsequently informed that Edwina Thompson, one of the experts, was unable to assume her functions. I should like to inform you that, following consultations with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia, I have appointed Charles M. Lengalenga (Zambia) to replace Ms. Thompson as finance expert for the Group.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Ban Ki-moon**



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
14 November 2007
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-second session
Agenda item 17
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-second year

**Identical letters dated 13 November 2007 from the Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations committed from 1 to 7 November 2007 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 17, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nawaf Salam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



**Annex to the identical letters dated 13 November 2007 from the
Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council**

**Israeli violations, acts of aggression and other activities from
1 to 7 November 2007, inclusive**

Air violations

On 1 November 2007:

- Between 0929 and 1010 hours four Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah heading east, circled over the regions of the South, the Western Bekaa and the Shuf, then left over the sea off Naqurah;
- Between 0934 and 1040 hours two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Kila, circled over the regions of the North and the South, then left over `Alma al-Sha`b;
- Between 1204 and 1405 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah, circled over the sea off Beirut, then headed south and left over the sea off Naqurah.

On 2 November 2007, between 1115 and 1200 hours, an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the regions of Bint Jubayl and Jazzin.

On 3 November 2007, at 1725 hours, an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah, circled over the sea between Beirut and the South, then left over the sea off Naqurah.

On 4 November 2007:

- Between 0700 and 1800 hours, an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft intermittently overflew the regions of Naqura, Tyre, Bint Jubayl and Nabatiyah;
- Between 1103 and 1120 hours two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh heading north, proceeded as far as Jubayl (Byblos) and continued in a northerly direction, then left over the sea off Naqurah;
- Between 1128 and 1250 hours two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh heading north, circled over Shikka, Beirut and the South, then left over Naqurah;
- Between 2002 and 2150 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Tyre, circled over the sea between Beirut and the South, then left over the sea off Naqurah;
- Between 2000 and 2230 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the regions of Naqurah, Tyre, Bint Jubayl, Nabatiyah and Kafr Shuba.

On 5 November 2007:

- Between 0950 and 1050 hours four Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh heading north, proceeded as far as Shikka, circled over all the regions of Lebanon, then left over 'Alma al-Sha'b;
- Between 1320 and 1330 hours Israeli military aircraft overflew the regions of Naqurah and Tibnin at extremely high altitude;
- At 1930 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah, proceeded as far as Beirut and circled over it, continued north as far as a point west of Batrun, then left over the sea off Naqurah at 0400 hours on 6 November 2007.

On 6 November 2007:

- Between 0715 and 1000 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Naqurah region at extremely high altitude;
- Between 0935 and 1015 hours four Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba, circled over the regions of the Shuf, the South and the Western Bekaa, then left over the sea off Naqurah;
- Between 1100 and 1330 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the regions of Naqurah and Nabatiyah at extremely high altitude.

On 7 November 2007, between 1000 and 1025 hours, Israeli military aircraft overflew the Naqurah region at extremely high altitude.

Sea violations

On 7 November 2007, at 1750 hours, within the territorial waters of occupied Palestine in the open sea off Ra's Naqurah, an Israeli enemy gunboat directed searchlights at Lebanese territorial waters.

Field violations

On 4 November 2007, at 2215 hours, the Israeli enemy shined a searchlight from the western gate of the Zarit barracks in the direction of Tarbikha and Jabal Balat, within Lebanese territory, for 15 seconds.

On 6 November 2007:

- Between 1630 and 1715 hours Israeli enemy forces fired a number of medium-weapon rounds from their Summaqah position within the occupied Shab'a Farms (opposite Kafr Shuba) into the area surrounding the position;
- Between 2140 and 2200 hours the Israeli enemy shined a searchlight from the Zarit barracks in the direction of Jabal Balat (Marwahin), within Lebanese territory.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
14 November 2007

Original: English

**Letter dated 12 November 2007 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I write to you with regard to the appointment of the next Commissioner of the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission ("Commission") established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1595 (2005). The current Commissioner, Serge Brammertz, has informed me that he will not be available to head the Commission following the expiration of his mandate on 31 December 2007.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Brammertz for his leadership in advancing the investigation and for his commitment to assisting the Lebanese Government and people in bringing an end to impunity in their country.

I hereby wish to inform the Security Council of my intention to appoint Daniel Bellemare, of Canada, as the next Commissioner. Until recently, Mr. Bellemare served as Deputy Attorney General of Canada and Special Adviser to the Deputy Minister of Justice. Prior to that, he was the Assistant Deputy Attorney General of Canada for Criminal Law.

I further wish to notify the Security Council that, under my authority pursuant to article 3 of the annex to Security Council resolution 1757 (2007) on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon ("annex"), and upon the recommendation of the selection panel established for this purpose, I will appoint Mr. Bellemare as the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal. He will, however, commence his official duties as the Prosecutor at a later date in keeping with the provisions of the annex.

In accordance with article 17, paragraph (a) of the annex, I am of the view that this approach will help to ensure a coordinated transition from the activities of the Commission to those of the Office of the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal.

(Signed) **Ban Ki-moon**





Security Council

Distr.: General
14 November 2007

Original: English

Letter dated 14 November 2007 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 November 2007 (S/2007/669) concerning your intention to appoint Daniel Bellemare, of Canada, as the Commissioner of the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission established following the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1595 (2005), has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(Signed) R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa
President of the Security Council



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
14 November 2007

Original: English

**Twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo****I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1756 (2007) of 15 May 2007, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 31 December 2007 and requested me to submit to the Council by 15 November 2007 a report containing benchmarks and an indicative timetable for the gradual drawdown of MONUC. The report reviews the major political and security developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 20 March to 31 October 2007 and outlines a concept of operations for implementing the mandate set out in resolution 1756 (2007). It also provides broad benchmarks and recommendations regarding the future direction of MONUC.

II. Political developments

2. Since my report of 20 March 2007 (S/2007/156), the Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced two major security crises, both of which engendered major violations of human rights. In March, intense fighting in Kinshasa between Government forces and personal security elements of former Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba resulted in several hundred deaths and extensive property damage. Since August, the failure of dissident former general Laurent Nkunda to send his troops to *brassage* has led to renewed fighting and the displacement of more than 150,000 people in North Kivu alone. Despite these difficulties, historic first steps have been made towards the establishment of democratic institutions and the extension of State authority throughout the country.

3. The newly installed Government continued its work, convening regular meetings of the Council of Ministers during which a number of decrees, regulations and draft laws were approved. The draft laws conveyed by the Council of Ministers to the National Assembly have included the draft laws on decentralization and on establishment of the new Independent National Electoral Commission. The two chambers of Parliament have each begun their second regular session and completed two one-month extraordinary sessions. In the first session of its five-year term, the Parliament has begun to exercise its oversight function through investigative



commissions, convocations of ministers and vigorous debates on pressing issues such as the security situation in the Kivus, the violence in early 2007 in Bas-Congo and the Kahemba border dispute with Angola.

4. Significant harassment of opposition figures was evident following the violence in Bas-Congo and Kinshasa. However, a working coexistence has emerged in Parliament between governing and opposition political camps, particularly the *Alliance pour la majorité présidentielle* (AMP) and the *Mouvement de libération du Congo* (MLC). In this connection, the opposition is proportionately represented in all National Assembly commissions, including in leadership positions.

5. Parliament has adopted two laws, namely the law for provisional credits and the 2007 budget law, and voted in favour of the ratification of five treaties, including the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region. Discussions are at an advanced stage on important legislation such as the law on the status of the opposition and the law on the financing of political parties. More than 30 items are on the agenda of the current parliamentary session, including the 2008 budget, laws on decentralization and local elections and reform packages for the justice sector.

6. The progress of the 10 provincial assemblies has been slowed by logistical and financial difficulties. However, most assemblies reconvened on 15 September, programmes of work have been adopted in all provinces and budgets have been adopted in all except Kasai Oriental. On 20 May, the Presidents of 10 of the 11 provincial assemblies jointly adopted the Matadi Declaration, underscoring the constitutional autonomy of the provinces and contesting the Government's attempts at continued direct administrative and financial control in the provinces. Specifically, the provincial assemblies requested immediate application of article 175 of the Constitution regarding retention at provincial level of 40 per cent of the revenues generated there. A mixed commission of national and provincial executives and legislators subsequently agreed to postpone implementation of this measure until January 2008, to allow time to devise the necessary regulatory and administrative frameworks.

7. With assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Ministry of the Interior, Decentralization and Homeland Security has been conducting broad public consultations on the decentralization process. From 3 to 5 October, some 300 national and provincial officials from the executive and legislative branches, representatives of civil society and international partners participated in a national forum on decentralization. The forum's recommendations were transmitted for consideration by the National Assembly as it deliberates on the draft decentralization law.

8. Serious financial constraints complicate the attempts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to establish and foster the development of democratic institutions and ensure future stability and peace. Non-existent or barely functioning State institutions and decaying infrastructure, along with a lack of resources, continue to hamper the Government's efforts to extend basic services and to address the urgent needs of the population. The Government is making progress towards meeting the targets under the International Monetary Fund's staff-monitored programme. However, it continues to face budgetary challenges, including a significant accumulation of undisbursed funds, which inhibit its ability to launch major initiatives or meet salaries and other operating expenses.

9. To support implementation of its 2007-2011 programme and the governance contract (see S/2007/156, para. 9), the Government elaborated with international donors in June the Priority Action Programme. The Programme considered a step towards a mutually accountable partnership between the international community and the Government, includes a set of high-priority reforms and initiatives to be implemented over an 18-month period. Ensuring sufficient funding for these activities remains a high priority, particularly in the light of the possibility of the World Bank reclassifying the Democratic Republic of the Congo from its present "post-conflict" status, which brings significant financial allocations, to that of a regular recipient of support from the International Development Association basket. Concerned that funding gaps are a major factor inhibiting growth, the Government has secured financial support from new partners, particularly in the transport and infrastructure sectors. As these new partnerships are forged, it will be vital for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the international community to maintain a shared vision of the priorities for reform, including debt sustainability and good governance.

10. In the absence of effective communication with the public regarding its intentions and the constraints it faces in achieving its programme, the Government of Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga faces increasing criticism from political and civil society actors. Members of the pro-Government AMP have occasionally voted against Government-backed programmes and policies such as the 2007 budget. The Prime Minister and key ministers have also been threatened with no-confidence motions.

III. Security environment

11. With the exception of the eastern part of the country, most of the Democratic Republic of the Congo remained largely stable during the period under review. The continued presence in the east of local and foreign armed groups and of militia members and other combatants not integrated into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) remains a significant source of insecurity. Undisciplined and under-supported FARDC troops remain a threat to the security of the population, as do demobilized former combatants who have yet to be reintegrated.

A. North Kivu

12. Since March, the security situation in North Kivu has deteriorated sharply as clashes have increased between armed elements loyal to renegade commander Laurent Nkunda and FARDC troops, Mayi-Mayi groups and other armed militias including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The clashes reflect the failure of "mixing", by which pro-Nkunda and Government elements were brought under nominal FARDC command in North Kivu without being fully integrated into the armed forces. In the face of rising tensions, provincial and local leaders demonstrated a commitment to reconciliation. Mr. Nkunda, however, claiming to protect the Tutsi minority and taking unilateral action against FDLR, intensified his interference in the chain of command over mixed brigades. He also

continued to recruit and maintain a separate militia, estimated at 5,000 fighters, and to set up a parallel civil administration, including police, in areas under his control.

13. On 11 May, the Government declared an end to "mixing" and called for the *brassage* of all mixed brigades, while deploying additional FARDC forces to North Kivu in order to free the mixed brigades for *brassage*. The mixed brigades began to disintegrate and on 27 August the dissident elements initiated attacks against Government forces.

14. During the subsequent fighting, MONUC concentrated on the protection of civilians by deploying additional mobile operation bases and patrols; providing logistical and medical assistance to FARDC; blocking access by Nkunda's forces to major population centres, including Goma and Sake; and protecting concentrations of minorities and internally displaced persons. On 6 September, following the initial disintegration of the FARDC 15th Integrated Brigade in the face of Nkunda's advancing troops at Sake, intervention by MONUC halted the dissidents' further advance into the town. MONUC then facilitated a local cessation of hostilities. However, heavy fighting resumed on 8 October when Nkunda repudiated the informal ceasefire brokered by MONUC. Skirmishes have continued, with FARDC troops improving their positions. The ongoing build-up of Government troops and supplies in North Kivu has led to the subsequent encirclement of Nkunda's forces and a significant reduction of areas under his control.

15. In view of the spontaneous surrender of a number of Nkunda loyalists, the Government extended until 15 October the deadline announced earlier in the month for Nkunda's troops to enter *brassage*. In remarks to the press, President Joseph Kabila reiterated his determination to use force if necessary to ensure the restoration of State authority. He emphasized the Government's commitment to protect the Tutsi and all other Congolese communities, stating that it was the sole responsibility of a national and unified Congolese army. He added that Mayi-Mayi and other militias were also required to enter *brassage*, and that his Government had presented a plan to Rwanda and MONUC for a definitive solution to the problem of FDLR.

16. The tactical redeployment of FARDC forces in North Kivu in the course of its operations against Nkunda have often created security vacuums exploited by FDLR, in alliance with the Resistance Patriots-Mayi-Mayi and the *Front pour la libération du Nord-Kivu* (FLNK). FDLR and affiliated groups have attacked Nkunda's forces, further complicating the situation and forcing the displacement of thousands of civilians. Clashes on 20 October at Bunagana between elements under the command of Mayi-Mayi leader Kasereka Kabamba and Nkunda's forces resulted in the flight of an estimated 10,000 refugees into Uganda. In the wake of these developments, President Kabila called on Kasereka Kabamba to voluntarily disarm in 72 hours or face military action. On 27 October, in an operation jointly planned with MONUC, FARDC troops surrounded Kasereka Kabamba, resulting in his surrender.

17. In addition to precipitating a humanitarian crisis, the fighting in North Kivu has raised serious human rights concerns. On 8 September, MONUC confirmed reports of 12 mass graves near Sake in locations previously held by Nkunda-led forces. A joint investigation with Congolese judicial authorities confirmed that the graves contained the remains of at least 21 victims, six with hands tied behind the back. There is also continuing evidence of the recruitment of children by armed groups, including an attempt on 15 October by Nkunda-led forces to forcibly recruit

some 210 students from a school near Bunagana. The students escaped to Rutshuru, where they are being protected by MONUC.

18. Despite the ongoing conflict, provincial institutions are being established in North Kivu. Governor Julien Paluku has established a provincial reconciliation cell and the province's inter-ethnic committee and various political and civil society actors have undertaken local initiatives to promote dialogue. The Government has also announced its intention to hold a widely inclusive conference on the Kivus in order to establish a broad and definitive consensus for peace and reconciliation, but no date has yet been set for the conference.

B. South Kivu

19. In South Kivu, the Government, with MONUC support, has intensified military operations against remaining armed groups. This has resulted in a sharp reduction in violent incidents, an upswing in economic activity, increased stability and improved humanitarian access. MONUC and FARDC have established mobile operation bases in the Kabare and Walungu areas and have intensified cordon and search operations against the "Rastas" in the Ninja and Mugaba forests. The armed group retaliated, attacking three villages on 26 May, killing 18 civilians, injuring 27 and abducting 18. A MONUC patrol later prevented the perpetrators from staging another attack. Several subsequent attacks have been interdicted.

20. In July, the FARDC encircled a number of Banyamulenge dissident militia members in the Moyens Plateaux region. Leaders Michel Rukunda (Moramvia Group) and Colonel Bisogo (Group of 47) refused *brassage*, escaping with about 200 of their fighters towards the Itombwe forest. They continue to ambush FARDC forces. On 14 September the militia leader Captain Yakutumba, a staunch opponent of the Banyamulenge, surrendered to the Government after a combination of military pressure and the inducement into *brassage* of 250 of his fighters. Despite some improvement in the security situation, numerous members of FDLR and smaller armed groups remain in South Kivu and are a source of continuing concern.

C. Ituri

21. While ethnic tensions continue over land use, the security situation in Ituri has improved. On 7 April, the Front nationaliste et intégrationniste (FNI) militia leader Peter Karim and some of his associates came forward for integration into the FARDC in response to Government outreach combined with FARDC and MONUC military pressure. A subsequent agreement on 1 June, incorporating the remaining Forces de résistance patriotique d'Ituri (FRPI) and Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais (MRC) militia groups, led to the launching on 5 August of a special disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for the remaining fighters in Ituri district. While the militia groups had listed some 4,665 names for the programme, that figure was believed to be inflated. By the end of the programme, some 1,851 combatants had disarmed. Demobilized fighters are to enter special UNDP-arranged labour-intensive community reinsertion work programmes. The remaining elements of FNI and FRPI, now fracturing into smaller groups, will be subject to pressure, from FARDC, supported by MONUC, to submit to disarmament. On 30 October Peter Karim and Cobra Matata, leader of FNI, arrived

in Bunia. They are expected to be dispatched along with Matthieu Ngudjolo, the leader of MRC, for FARDC training outside Ituri district.

D. Katanga and Maniema

22. The situation in parts of Maniema and Katanga provinces, where both MONUC and FARDC are thinly deployed, requires continued vigilance. On 6 July, an estimated 400 Mayi-Mayi surrounded the residence of the territorial administrator in Punia, Maniema Province, voicing anger over long-awaited disarmament, demobilization and reintegration entitlements. On 1 August, a violent protest against the United Nations in connection with the return of Banyamulenge refugees to Moba, in north-eastern Katanga, necessitated the evacuation of all United Nations civilian staff and associated personnel. In Maniema, the birthplace of several Mayi-Mayi movements, as well as in northern and central Katanga, thousands of combatants are still not included under any disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. The absence of an effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process presents security risks for the population and for United Nations and humanitarian personnel, particularly in remote areas where State authority is limited and access remains difficult.

E. Kinshasa

23. In Kinshasa, a stand-off in March between FARDC and about 300 personal security guards of Senator and former Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba triggered two days of intense conflict which resulted in the deaths of at least 300 people, including a significant number of civilians, and considerable property damage, including to some embassies and a United Nations office. Although Senator Bemba was formally charged by the Government with high treason, he and his immediate family were permitted to leave the country on 11 April to seek medical treatment under a leave of absence granted by the Senate. Security forces arrested over 200 people during and after the fighting, in many cases without following legal procedure. The security forces continued to harass opposition politicians and their supporters and ransacked the headquarters of Senator Bemba's MLC party as well as his radio and television stations. Senator Bemba has not yet returned to the country, reportedly owing to his own security concerns and the legal charges against him.

IV. Regional developments

24. On 3 August, following the alleged incursion into Congolese waters of a Ugandan oil exploration barge on Lake Albert, an armed exchange between FARDC and Ugandan forces resulted in the deaths of a FARDC soldier and a British citizen working for the oil company. On 24 September, in an unrelated incident, Ugandan forces fired on a passenger barge on Lake Albert which was carrying 42 Congolese civilians and two FARDC members. That incident led to the death of six civilians and the injury of a further nine, including one FARDC member. On 9 October, following talks on delineating the border, the two countries agreed to establish joint commissions on military, security and economic issues. Another joint commission is intended to monitor oil-related activities along the border.

25. During the reporting period Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda demonstrated intent to enhance regional collaboration. This has been reflected in a series of meetings of the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission and a number of bilateral meetings between Heads of State, ministers and chiefs of defence, as well as in the work of the subregional and regional groups established by the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region. On 17 April the subregional Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries was reactivated, and both chambers of Parliament have adopted the Great Lakes Pact, which is pending final action by the Presidency.

26. On 30 July, President Kabila and President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola signed an agreement on the joint exploration and exploitation of petroleum located in the maritime waters between the two countries. On 22 September, the National Assembly voted by a strong majority to endorse the agreement.

27. On 2 September, the foreign ministers of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda discussed in Kinshasa ongoing tensions in North Kivu and the continued presence of FDLR in both provinces. They agreed to reactivate a joint verification mechanism, decided that the African Union and MONUC should be asked to support a secretariat in Goma, and requested that MONUC intensify border surveillance. A joint verification team meeting scheduled for 15 October did not, however, occur as Rwanda recalled its delegation.

28. On 8 September, at a meeting in the United Republic of Tanzania, the Presidents of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda agreed to withdraw troops from their common border and to strengthen bilateral cooperation in a number of areas, including exploitation of natural resources in and around Lake Albert, and to eliminate negative forces operating from their territories. The two countries' military chiefs of staff have also held bilateral discussions.

29. During the reporting period, the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission met four times under the facilitation of the United States of America, with MONUC attending as an observer. On 18 April, the group reached agreement on joint action to address the root causes of conflict in the Great Lakes region. On 28 August, a meeting of chiefs of defence discussed strategies to deal with FDLR. These were subsequently reviewed, along with directives for follow-up, at a ministerial meeting in Kampala on 17 September. The chiefs of defence also decided that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should prepare a detailed operational plan for possible military operations against FDLR, to be conducted jointly with MONUC and possibly with additional support from other countries. The Government pledged to submit such a plan at the next tripartite ministerial meeting in January 2008.

30. A newly established joint planning cell met in Kisangani on 20 September 2007; and the reconstituted joint verification mechanism between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda met at vice-ministerial level in Goma on 21 September. At a meeting on 1 October, Tripartite Plus chiefs of defence endorsed the structure, organization and operating procedures of the joint planning cell and discussed joint verification mechanisms and other procedures for the management of cross-border incidents.

V. Security sector reform

31. During the reporting period, important steps were taken towards security sector reform. In July, at the first Contact Group meeting under its leadership, the Government focused on defence sector reform, setting a tight initial deadline for headquarters restructuring and the formation of a rapid reaction force to gradually replace MONUC within two years. An outline concept for the longer-term development of additional military, air and naval forces was also discussed. The Contact Group endorsed the holding of a round table to consider a road map for the reform of all three sectors (defence, police and judiciary) and associated international support. The meeting was initially planned for early October, but has since been postponed.

32. With respect to the military sector, MONUC and other international experts are participating at the request of the Ministry of Defence in subcommissions on global management, force management, human resources, administration and relations between the armed forces and the nation. These subcommissions will identify specific programmes for which multilateral or bilateral support may be proposed at the round table.

33. On 2 July, MONUC commenced its short-term training programme for 33 battalions (11 brigades) as mandated by Security Council resolution 1756 (2007). The three-month programme focuses on discipline and conduct, as well as on enhancing operational capacity and cohesion. Human rights, child protection, international humanitarian law and the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence are also included in the training course. A total of 3,750 FARDC troops have completed the first training series, including 1,500 who participated in the pilot programme and 2,250 in the first session. Two additional MONUC training task forces are being deployed in order to accelerate the programme and complete the training by September 2009.

34. Some 60,000 Congolese National Police members, including 2,345 women, have received limited training. Police training has declined during the reporting period owing to a shortage of donor funds. With regard to overall police reform, Prime Minister Gizenga has signed a decree creating the Committee on the Reform of the Congolese National Police. An inter-ministerial commission has also begun drafting an organic law on the organization of the National Police.

35. The Ministries of Defence and Justice have begun initiatives to address impunity for violent crimes and corruption, pending longer-term reforms. MONUC is conducting training for military magistrates and lawyers and is providing advice on the reform of military justice codes. MONUC is also supporting ministries in the elaboration of strategies for strengthening civilian and military justice and the penal system. This includes assistance to the Ministry of Justice for the development of a strategic framework for justice reform, a strategic development plan for the prison system and prison legislation. These strategies are expected to be integrated into an overall security sector reform programme for discussion at the forthcoming round table.

VI. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

36. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese combatants belonging to various armed groups, and a definitive solution to the presence on Congolese soil of foreign combatants including those of FDLR, the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU) and the Lord's Resistance Army, will be key to establishing a stable security environment, leading to the gradual drawdown and departure of MONUC. To date, the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has processed 165,687 former combatants. Of these, 62,929 have been integrated into FARDC while 102,758 have been demobilized and are receiving financial entitlements. About 15,300 of an estimated 18,500 foreign fighters, primarily from FDLR, have been repatriated.

37. Despite the considerable progress made, major challenges remain. Only 54,697 of the Congolese former combatants who have entered the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme are targeted by longer-term reintegration projects. Those excluded from these projects are a source of frequently violent unrest throughout the country. In addition, approximately 78,096 eligible Congolese combatants have yet to enter the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. An additional 19,400 combatants, consisting of Mayi-Mayi and other elements not signatory to the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are outside the purview of the national programme.

VII. Humanitarian situation

38. The overall humanitarian situation has improved in many provinces, with more than one million internally displaced persons having returned to their homes since the beginning of 2006. However, the situation in the eastern part of the country, particularly in the Kivus, remains of serious concern. The total number of internally displaced persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo now stands at 1.2 million, with the large majority located in North and South Kivu. An estimated 371,550 people have been displaced in North Kivu alone between December 2006 and October 2007. Fighting in North Kivu has also resulted in refugee movements from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into Uganda. The capacity of the humanitarian community in the region is overstretched. Only 56 per cent of the \$686 million requested through the 2007 Humanitarian Action Plan has been received and resources have been mobilized through the Central Emergency Response Fund. Humanitarian access is often hampered by poor security conditions and infrastructure, as well as armed groups and national security forces.

VIII. Human rights and child protection

39. The human rights situation, including impunity within the security services, remains a cause for grave concern. Reported cases of arbitrary execution, rape, torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment by FARDC and the Congolese National Police are growing. Military and civilian intelligence services, the Special Services Branch of the National Police in Kinshasa and the Republican Guard have

also been implicated in politically motivated crimes, including intimidation of opposition members, journalists and human rights activists. During the reporting period, particularly egregious offences, including summary executions and the recruitment of child soldiers, have been committed in North Kivu by Nkunda's dissident forces.

40. Rape and other forms of sexual violence remain prevalent, with few perpetrators reaching the justice system. Many of those accused are released on bail with no subsequent appearance. Convicted offenders often receive very light sentences and on occasion are permitted to escape from detention. Police and military commanders, as well as local authorities, continue to encourage families of rape victims to settle out of court.

41. On 18 October, the Government handed over Germain Katanga to the International Criminal Court. Katanga has been indicted on three charges of crimes against humanity and six charges of war crimes. Thirteen FARDC officers who were responsible for executions, rape and systematic looting in Ituri between August and November 2006 were sentenced to life imprisonment. Otherwise, there has been very little progress in combating impunity. None of the serious incidents committed in Bas-Congo or during the events in Kinshasa are being thoroughly investigated or brought to trial. The administration of civil and military justice remains prone to corruption and is significantly lacking in resources. Political and military authorities continue to interfere in high-profile cases, including the verdicts pronounced in the trial of suspects for the murder of Radio Okapi journalist Serge Maheshe.

42. During her visit in May, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, encouraged the Government to establish a vetting process to ensure that human rights violators are excluded from State institutions including the security services. With the endorsement of President Kabila, the High Commissioner also launched a mapping exercise of serious human rights violations committed in the country between 1993 and 2003. The results of this survey are intended to assist the Government in developing a transitional justice strategy for the country. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNDP and MONUC are in the process of raising the necessary funds and completing other preparations for the mapping exercise.

43. Sexual and gender-based violence remains endemic throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with security services among the worst offenders. All MONUC training for FARDC soldiers therefore addresses the causes and consequences of sexual violence and includes an introduction to international human rights law including women's rights. MONUC is also promoting awareness among military magistrates of the laws on sexual violence, adopted and promulgated in 2006 but seldom applied. MONUC is working with donors and the Ministries of Defence and Justice to implement a one-year, countrywide dissemination and training programme to promote the application of the new laws.

44. In May, MONUC and the European Commission launched a project to build up civil society capacity for the protection of human rights defenders, victims and witnesses. The Government has drafted a new child protection law for submission to the current session of the National Assembly, and MONUC has launched a six-month campaign to reinforce the role of the National Police in child protection.

IX. Local elections

45. As I reported previously, Prime Minister Gizenga wrote to me on 1 March requesting United Nations technical and logistical assistance for the envisaged local elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Prime Minister also requested that the United Nations coordinate all international assistance to the elections. By resolution 1756 (2007), the Security Council acknowledged the importance of these elections as a milestone for the longer-term restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation and establishment of the rule of law in the country. The Council authorized MONUC to provide preliminary assistance to the Congolese authorities in the organization, preparation and conduct of local elections, including the provision of advice, technical assistance and logistical support. Local elections are the last and crucial part of the electoral cycle envisaged by the 2002 All-Inclusive Agreement.

46. After considering the option of holding local elections a few provinces at a time over a period of several months, the Government has opted for simultaneous countrywide direct elections on a single day in the second half of 2008. In order to establish the required framework to meet this schedule, the Organic Law on the Independent National Electoral Commission was adopted by the Council of Ministers and transmitted on 12 June to the National Assembly. On 27 August the Supreme Court reaffirmed the continued exercise by the transition-period elections commission (the Independent Electoral Commission) of its role and authority until the new commission is in place. In addition, the draft law on decentralization currently before the National Assembly will, *inter alia*, confirm the territorial boundaries of the electoral districts.

47. On 15 October, a joint delegation from the Ministry of the Interior, the Independent Electoral Commission, UNDP and MONUC began a series of visits to provincial capitals to inform local authorities and electoral officials of preparations for the 2008 elections. In view of the poor representation of women following last year's elections, MONUC and United Nations partners are taking steps to improve voter education and electoral outreach to women. A draft law on gender parity, now under consideration by the Council of Ministers, also offers prospects for improved results for women in the local elections.

48. The local elections will involve approximately the same number of voters and polling stations as the national elections, but will be considerably more complex. Some 200,000 candidates are expected to compete in more than 6,000 constituencies, as compared to 13,000 candidates in 169 constituencies in the national elections. To address this challenge, the Independent Electoral Commission will need to expand considerably its field structure. In that regard, the Government has promised to increase funding for the Commission. Its planning capability is also being enhanced by continued assistance from MONUC and the initiation, on 1 May, of a five-year UNDP institutional capacity-building project.

49. Given the size of the country and the lack of surface transport, the Government and electoral authorities will require substantial support from MONUC, particularly in the form of logistical assistance and technical advice on a scale similar to that provided during the national elections. The requested support includes air transportation of electoral materials from Kinshasa and 15 hubs to some 210 sites across the country, as no other national entity is capable of carrying out this task.

50. The budget for the local elections, excluding the additional MONUC support and electoral security, is currently estimated at \$117.8 million. The Government has agreed to defray the cost of electoral personnel and the operating costs of the Independent Electoral Commission. Donors are being requested to provide some \$92.4 million to cover all other costs. The current cost estimate of additional MONUC support is between \$80 million and \$100 million. As I indicated in my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 11 October, early authorization by the Council of full MONUC support, on the same scale as for the national elections, is essential in order to facilitate important decisions by the Congolese authorities and donors and to allow sufficient lead time for the Mission's preparations.

X. Conduct and discipline

51. My Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to give high priority to the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as other types of misconduct by MONUC personnel, through strong preventive measures. During the first half of 2007, nearly 10,000 Mission personnel received training, including a new programme tailored specifically to international and locally recruited civilian staff. Seven assessment missions were conducted in the various parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo where MONUC personnel are deployed, and monthly, quarterly and biannual analyses were prepared of all cases.

52. During the reporting period, the Mission has recommended the repatriation on disciplinary grounds of 11 members of the military and police components as a consequence of substantiated allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, or related contraventions of preventive measures. Since the establishment of the Office for Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in early 2005, a total of 52 repatriations on disciplinary grounds have been recommended.

XI. Future direction of the Mission

53. MONUC, in close consultation with the United Nations country team, has developed a concept of operations for implementing its mandate under resolution 1756 (2007), including benchmarks and an indicative timeline for the gradual drawdown of the Mission. To assist the Mission in its strategic planning, a DPKO-led technical assessment mission comprising representatives of the Department of Field Support, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Department of Safety and Security and UNDP, visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 9 to 20 July. The mission consulted with the MONUC leadership and with senior Congolese officials including the Presidents of the Senate and National Assembly, leaders of parliamentary groups, the Minister of Defence and the President of the Independent Electoral Commission, and with representatives of Congolese civil society. The mission also met with representatives of the diplomatic community in Kinshasa; the European Union Mission of Assistance for Security Sector Reform (EUSEC), the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) and the European Commission; the

United Nations country team; the International Committee of the Red Cross and international humanitarian non-governmental organizations. Members of the mission visited MONUC field offices and contingents in Kisangani and Bukavu. A separate mission to assess the MONUC communications and public information programme was conducted by the Department of Public Information in August. The conclusions and recommendations of these assessment missions are reflected in the present report.

54. Based on its current mandate, MONUC will concentrate its efforts in Ituri, the Kivus and northern Katanga, where it will continue to focus on protection of the civilian population and humanitarian activities. It will also support FARDC in developing and conducting operations aimed at stabilizing these areas and dismantling illegal armed groups, enabling the Congolese army and police to assume as soon as possible their full responsibility for security and the protection of the population, and assisting the Government to re-establish its authority in the area. MONUC, within its mandate and capabilities, and as requested by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, will also support regional stabilization and confidence-building initiatives, such as joint verification mechanisms or increased border patrols agreed bilaterally or through multilateral discussions.

55. MONUC will continue to advise and assist the Government and the Independent Electoral Commission in preparing for local elections. In addition, the Mission's military and police components will stand ready to support the Congolese authorities, as may be required, in establishing a secure and peaceful environment for the elections. The Mission will also provide additional electoral advisers and direct logistical assistance for the actual conduct of the local elections, to the extent authorized by the Security Council and subject to the availability of the necessary supplementary resources.

56. While focusing on security in the eastern part of the country, MONUC will deploy police and civilian personnel in all provinces in order to develop the capacities of the Congolese National Police and related law enforcement agencies; to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law; and to investigate human rights violations with a view to helping put an end to impunity. MONUC will also provide advice for strengthening the capacity of the judicial and correctional systems with an emphasis on the military justice system. Planning will begin for the handover to the United Nations country team and other partners of longer-term capacity-building activities, particularly for the police and judiciary, which cannot be completed within the anticipated lifespan of the Mission. In this context, MONUC will serve as a catalyst and facilitator, with a view to encouraging the engagement of other international partners to support long-term efforts in fields such as security sector reform.

57. The public information component of MONUC will continue to adapt and implement a communications strategy to complement other actions by the Mission and its partners to deal with the situation in the Kivus. The Mission's overall public information and communications plan will also focus on helping to prepare the population for the local elections. It will explore possibilities for helping Government institutions and Parliament to build capacity for communications and for assisting in the development and rationalization of local media. Through the Mission's partnership with the Fondation Hirondelle, Radio Okapi will remain a key element of the MONUC public information effort.

XII. Benchmarks and drawdown

58. In line with the Security Council's request for benchmarks and an indicative timetable for the gradual withdrawal of the Mission, the technical assessment mission sought the views of its Congolese and international interlocutors and the United Nations country team. The consultations revealed a consensus that any plan for the Mission's downsizing and eventual withdrawal should be based on several key preconditions: (a) that Congolese and foreign armed groups would be disarmed and demobilized or repatriated to the extent that they no longer posed a significant threat to peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or to neighbouring countries, particularly in the east; (b) that FARDC and the Congolese National Police would achieve levels of capacity which would enable them to assume responsibility for the country's security, including duties now performed by MONUC; and (c) that MONUC would remain deployed at its current strength at least through local elections. Further to these operational preconditions, benchmarks were identified for measuring the country's progress towards two overarching objectives reflecting the central priorities in resolution 1756 (2007), namely (a) the establishment of an overall stable security environment and (b) the consolidation of democratic institutions.

59. With regard to the establishment of a stable security environment, progress towards the overall objective would be measured by the achievement of broad benchmarks such as (a) stabilization of sensitive areas, particularly in the east; (b) completion of the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and the disarmament and/or repatriation of foreign armed groups; (c) extension of State authority throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (d) security sector reform, comprising creation of national armed forces respectful of human rights and the rule of law with the operational capacity to defend the constitutional institutions and the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; development of a unified national police entrusted with public security and capable of protecting the people and their property while maintaining law and order and respect for human rights; and the establishment of an independent, functioning judicial system.

60. With respect to the consolidation of democratic institutions, the following broad benchmarks were identified: (a) adoption of essential legislation and establishment of essential State institutions at the national, provincial and local level, and progress made towards decentralization; and (b) successful conduct of credible local elections.

61. MONUC, in consultation with the Government and other stakeholders, would further develop these broad benchmarks and prepare a matrix setting out measurable indicators, to the extent possible, to be included in my next report to the Security Council. It should be emphasized that, given the magnitude of the challenges facing the Democratic Republic of the Congo, achievement of these broad benchmarks, as well as of certain specific indicators, is beyond the capacity and mandate of MONUC alone. The overarching benchmarks themselves are unlikely to be achieved during the life of the Mission. Progress will require sustained support from many actors, including the Government and its bilateral partners, the neighbouring States and the wider international community. Should the Security Council endorse these broad benchmarks for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I intend to include in

future reports to the Council an evaluation of the progress achieved and the indicators used to measure such progress.

XIII. Financial aspects

62. The General Assembly, by its resolution 61/281 of 29 June 2007, appropriated \$1,112,739,500, equivalent to \$92,728,292 per month, for MONUC for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MONUC beyond 31 December 2007, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2008 would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly.

63. As at 31 July, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MONUC amounted to \$683.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$2,797.6 million.

64. As at 31 August, the amount owed to troop and formed-police contributors totalled \$84.0 million. Reimbursement of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs have been made for the period up to 31 May.

XIV. Observations and recommendations

65. Since my last report, the Government has demonstrated a strong determination to exert its sovereign responsibilities throughout the country, engaged with its neighbours, worked closely with the international community to advance planning for recovery and economic development, taken the first steps towards security sector reform, initiated key legislation and made a firm commitment to decentralization and the early holding of local elections. The Parliament is also to be commended for the assiduous manner in which it has collectively shouldered its responsibilities. The emergence of assertive provincial governments, as provided for in the Constitution, is also a welcome development, as effective decentralization is an essential element to good governance, stability and growth in a country as vast as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

66. Notwithstanding these positive developments, prospects for the future continue to be overshadowed by long-standing security challenges in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The rule of law and respect for human rights, in particular by security services, must also be strengthened. These challenges require MONUC to maintain a robust capacity in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and a continued police, rule of law, human rights, political, and civil affairs presence throughout the country. I therefore recommend renewal of the Mission's mandate for a period of one year, and that it retain its current complement of military, police and civilian personnel at least until the end of the local elections. Gradual drawdown may then commence, subject to progress towards the broad benchmarks set out in the present report, including successful completion of the local elections, and, most importantly, towards ensuring the security of the population.

67. The crisis in the Kivus has many dimensions which call for a comprehensive solution, including an end to the fighting, the disarmament and demobilization or integration into the armed forces of militias and the re-establishment of State authority and rule of law. Steps are also urgently needed to resolve the problems

presented by all foreign armed groups on Congolese soil, particularly FDLR, which constitutes the most destabilizing element. A purely military solution to this issue is neither desirable nor viable. In order to address the problem of foreign armed groups, a common approach and close cooperation will be needed between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other States in the region, supported by the international community. In this regard, I am encouraged by the recent bilateral meetings between senior representatives of the Governments concerned and their contacts through multilateral and regional mechanisms.

68. Conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be separated from its regional aspects. I welcome the emergence during the reporting period of increasing dialogue among Great Lakes countries, both bilaterally and through mechanisms such as the Great Lakes Pact and the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission. Improvement of regional relations, particularly but not exclusively related to security, should be sustained by concrete follow-up action by all Governments as a public sign of their determination to work together in resolving cross-border issues.

69. There is increasing recognition that the intertwined problems created by the activities of Nkunda and his militia, FDLR and other foreign and Congolese armed groups must be addressed simultaneously through an approach that involves all major stakeholders, both within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the Great Lakes region. I therefore dispatched Haile Menkerios, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, on 1 November to undertake a special mission to the region to consult with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and leaders in the region, as well as with the Government's bilateral and multilateral partners, to find ways to resolve the immediate crisis and to address its underlying causes. Mr. Menkerios is coordinating closely with my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with international partners currently engaged in initiatives to help resolve the crisis.

70. The protection of civilians of all communities is central to the resolution of the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUC will continue to focus on its mandate for the protection of civilians and to work in close cooperation with the Government and the Congolese security forces to this end.

71. In order to enable the Congolese military, police and judiciary and correctional services to assume their full responsibilities as MONUC begins its drawdown, a strong security sector reform programme is needed. Such a programme should reflect a unity of vision among the relevant Congolese actors and between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its international partners. Such a programme should lead to an early operational capacity for essential military tasks, as well as steady progress in reform of the police and judiciary. Progress in security sector reform is essential for the Mission's exit strategy, and will require the committed effort of national and international actors. I urge the Government and its international partners to seize the opportunity presented by the planned round table on security sector reform to develop a detailed and coherent blueprint without delay.

72. Fighting impunity within the security services will further increase their effectiveness by allowing them to win the confidence and support of the people. I therefore call upon the Government to take advantage of the assistance and advice of the international community, including MONUC, and to further intensify its efforts to hold accountable members of the security services who are found guilty of human rights violations and other crimes.

73. While credible pressure is essential in dealing with the remaining armed groups in the east, experience in Ituri has shown that a gap in time between demobilization and reintegration, often caused by financial constraints, risks compromising the entire effort with serious consequences for security. Sufficient and timely donor funding is critical for channelling demobilized combatants to community reintegration. In this connection, I hope that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme will reach early agreement on terms for the resumption of activities under the Programme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Inadequate reintegration programmes and the discontent they engender have also been major causes of unrest throughout the country. I would therefore propose a comprehensive review of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with a view to capitalizing on lessons learned and determining how to ensure that former combatants can benefit from reintegration programmes without delay.

74. Sustainable peace and security will also require safer and more harmonious communities. In that connection, more attention to longer-term reintegration, including increased benefits for receiving communities, is required. Community disarmament programmes, which are about to be initiated by UNDP, must also be well supported in order to reduce the number of weapons in the hands of the population.

75. The decision of the Government to conduct local elections in 2008 represents a major step towards consolidating the considerable progress already achieved in the establishment of democracy. Encouraging progress has been made towards the adoption of laws on the status of the opposition and the financing of political parties. I urge political leaders at all levels to respect the principles of transparency, inclusiveness and tolerance of dissent so as to create space for reform and build the credibility of the country's legitimate institutions. As requested by the Government, I recommend that the Council authorize MONUC to provide full support to the local elections on the same scale as for the national elections in 2006, subject to progress by the Government and relevant national institutions in putting in place the legal, institutional and financial frameworks needed to conduct credible polls.


76. I would like to thank my Special Representative, William Lacy Swing, and the women and men of MONUC and the United Nations country team for their determination and dedication, particularly over the past difficult months. Their service, often under difficult conditions, has provided invaluable support for the efforts of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as they seek to realize their aspirations for peace, security and respect for human rights. My appreciation also goes to the countries contributing police and troops to MONUC, as well as to donor countries and the multilateral and non-governmental organizations that continue to provide the support needed to sustain progress in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Annex

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: military and civilian police strength as at 31 October 2007

Country	Military component			Total deployed	Civilian police
	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops		
Argentina	0	0	0	0	3
Bangladesh	16	9	1 333	1 358	250
Belgium	0	8	0	8	0
Benin	10	2	750	762	10
Bolivia	8	2	200	210	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	0	0	5	0
Burkina Faso	10	0	0	10	22
Cameroon	5	0	0	5	47
Canada	0	10	0	10	0
Central African Republic	0	0	0	0	7
China	13	3	218	234	0
Côte d'Ivoire	0	0	0	0	24
Czech Republic	3	0	0	3	0
Denmark	1	1	0	2	0
Egypt	22	0	0	22	5
France	0	6	0	6	9
Ghana	20	3	462	485	0
Guatemala	5	1	105	111	0
Guinea	0	0	0	0	9
India	39	14	4 380	4 433	247
Indonesia	13	2	175	190	0
Ireland	0	3	0	3	0
Jordan	20	5	66	91	4
Kenya	28	8	0	36	4
Madagascar	0	0	0	0	5
Malawi	24	0	111	135	0
Malaysia	7	10	0	17	0
Mali	20	2	0	22	22
Mongolia	2	0	0	2	0
Morocco	1	3	809	813	0
Nepal	17	3	1 030	1 050	0
Niger	18	1	0	19	62
Nigeria	25	1	0	26	0
Pakistan	38	17	3 580	3 635	0

Country	Military component				Civilian police
	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Total deployed	
Paraguay	14	0	0	14	0
Peru	7	0	0	7	0
Poland	2	0	0	2	0
Romania	21	0	0	21	1
Russian Federation	24	4	0	28	2
Senegal	11	15	460	486	266
South Africa	1	14	1 187	1 202	0
Serbia	0	0	6	6	0
Spain	3	0	0	3	0
Sri Lanka	4	0	0	4	0
Sweden	5	0	0	5	4
Switzerland	2	0	0	3	0
Tunisia	26	4	462	492	0
Turkey	0	0	0	0	1
Ukraine	6	0	0	6	5
United Kingdom	0	6	0	6	0
Uruguay	33	12	1 324	1 369	0
Vanuatu	0	0	0	0	2
Yemen	5	0	0	5	2
Zambia	20	4	0	24	0
Total	554	173	16 658	17 386	1 013



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
19 November 2007

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-second session
Agenda item 17
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-second year

**Letter dated 9 November 2007 from the Permanent
Representatives of Iraq and Turkey to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General**

As you know, the second enlarged meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Countries Neighbouring Iraq was held in Istanbul on 2 and 3 November 2007.

In addition to Iraq's neighbouring countries, Egypt, Bahrain, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the Group of Eight, as well as the United Nations, the League of Arab States and the European Union were represented at the meeting.

Upon instructions from our respective Governments, we request that you kindly circulate the present letter and the final communiqué of the Istanbul meeting (see annex) as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 17, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Hamid Al Bayati**

Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations

(Signed) **Baki Ilkin**

Ambassador

Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations



Annex to the letter dated 9 November 2007 from the Permanent Representatives of Iraq and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Final communiqué of the Ministerial Conference of the Countries Neighbouring Iraq, Egypt, Bahrain, the permanent members of the Security Council and the Group of Eight

Istanbul, 3 November 2007

Upon the invitation of the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq, the Foreign Ministers of the Countries Neighbouring Iraq, Egypt, Bahrain and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the G-8 held a meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, on 3 November 2007. The United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and the European Union also took part in the meeting. The meeting was designed to contribute concretely to the efforts of the Government and the people of Iraq to restore permanent peace, stability, and prosperity in their country through invigoration of the existing national reconciliation dialogue, in combating terrorism, strengthening the rule of law and widening participation in the political process. The meeting also serves to help create a stable atmosphere for Iraq and provide an ongoing standing forum for sustained active and energetic support to the Iraqi Government and Iraqi people. The meeting also served the purpose of the participant countries to reiterate their commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity, unity, full sovereignty and independence.

Their Highnesses and Excellencies who participated in the meeting were:

Bahrain	Foreign Minister H.E. Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Al Khalifa
Canada	H.E. Deepak Obhrai, Parliamentary Secretary to the Foreign Minister in charge of Asia-Pacific and Africa
China	Deputy Foreign Minister H.E. Wu Dawei
Egypt	Foreign Minister H.E. Ahmed Aboul Gheith
France	Foreign Minister H.E. Bernard Kouchner
Germany	Foreign Minister H.E. Frank Walter Steinmeier
Iran	Foreign Minister H.E. Manouchehr Mottaki
Iraq	Foreign Minister H.E. Hoshyar Zebari
Italy	Deputy Foreign Minister H.E. Ugo Intini
Japan	Deputy Foreign Minister H.E. Onodera Itsunori
Jordan	Foreign Minister H.E. Abdelelah Al Khatib
Kuwait	Foreign Minister H.E. Sheikh Mohammed Sabah Al Salim Al Sabah
Russian Federation	Deputy Foreign Minister H.E. Alexander Saltanov

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Foreign Minister H.E. Prince Saud Al-Faisal
Syria	Foreign Minister H.E. Walid Al-Moualem
Turkey	Foreign Minister H.E. Ali Babacan
United Kingdom	Deputy Foreign Minister H.E. Kim Howells
United States of America	Secretary of State H.E. Condoleezza Rice
United Nations	Secretary General H.E. Ban Ki-moon
EU Presidency (Portugal)	Foreign Minister H.E. Luis Amado
Secretariat of the Council of the EU	Representative Sophie Kisling
EU Commission	Commissioner H.E. Benita Ferrero Waldner
League of Arab States	Secretary General H.E. Amre Moussa
Organization of Islamic Conference	Secretary General H.E. Ekmeleddin İhsanoglu

The participants agreed to:

1. Reaffirm the independence, full sovereignty, national unity, territorial integrity, Arab and Islamic identity of Iraq; commit to the preservation of Iraq's internationally recognized borders; and pledge adherence to the principle of non-interference in Iraq's internal affairs.
2. Reaffirm full support of the efforts of the constitutionally based, elected Government and Council of Representatives of Iraq to achieve, in a speedy and effective manner, the goals of the Iraqi people for a prosperous, free, independent, united, democratic, and federal Iraq, and the basic right of all Iraqi citizens to participate peacefully in the ongoing political process.
3. Reconfirm the international community's as well as neighbours' commitment to promote peace, stability, and security in Iraq for the people of Iraq, the region, and the international community as a whole.
4. Recognize the value and importance of an ongoing and continuous expanded neighbours process; endorse the forming by the Iraqi Government an ad hoc expanded neighbours "support mechanism" in Baghdad, which will regularly review progress in implementing the conclusions reached at the ministerial meetings and disseminate the information in a timely manner; and welcome the United Nations offer to provide resources to such a "support mechanism", the terms and the mission to be agreed upon by the members of the expanded neighbours process.
5. Reaffirm working groups' functions to provide essential input and recommendations for political level neighbours meetings to enable them to take concrete decisions and contribute to Iraq's ongoing process, as well as regional stability, and in this context, endorse the recommendations proposed by the three working groups already convened and decide to maintain as long as required these working

groups on energy, security, and refugees created at the first expanded neighbours conference held in Sharm el Sheikh; convene as soon as possible the next sessions of these groups on security in Damascus, energy in Istanbul, and displaced persons in Amman, respectively; and invite these groups to submit their progress reports to the next ministerial meeting of the expanded neighbouring countries.

6. Welcome the Iraqi Government's efforts to strengthen the institutions of the representative government, reinforce political dialogue and national reconciliation, assist vulnerable groups, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and promote the protection of human rights and judicial and legal reform, and to foster strong and constructive relations with neighbouring countries.
7. Acknowledge the significance of reaching a common vision of the unity of the people of Iraq among the political parties; and encourage Iraqis to engage in comprehensive political dialogue and national reconciliation for the sake of Iraq's political stability and unity.
8. Welcome the common understanding put forward in the Final Communiqué of the Meeting of the Political Leaders of Iraq and encourage the Government of Iraq to achieve progress on enactment of legislation such as the justice and accountability law; constitutional amendments, gas and oil law, and a financial revenues law; and encourage the Government of Iraq to welcome all Iraqis not guilty of war crimes who disavow violence and terror into the political process.
9. Welcome the Iraqi Government's commitment to disarm and dismantle all militias and illegally armed groups, enforcing the rule of law, and ensuring the State's monopoly on armed forces.
10. Highlight the richness of the multicultural, multisectarian, and multi-ethnic structure of Iraq and the importance of securing and respecting peaceful coexistence of all communities, as well as the Iraqi identity, for the future of Iraq.
11. Call upon UNESCO, ALECSO, ISESCO and IRCICA to contribute to the preservation and revitalization of the historical heritage of Iraq that has been destroyed or damaged due to the war, and welcome active support from the neighbours and international community for this effort.
12. Urge all parties within Iraq to take steps to ensure the protection of civilians and create conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons.
13. Recognize the obligation of Iraq and the international community to protect and assist displaced Iraqis by addressing their immediate and foreseeable needs and safeguarding their safety; acknowledge the determined endeavours of the Syrian and Jordanian Governments in generously hosting the Iraqi displaced persons; and urge the international community to increase its support for the Iraqi displaced persons.

14. Commit to delivery of humanitarian and economic assistance in coordination with the Government of Iraq, also by contributing to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq.
15. Acknowledge the importance of the International Compact with Iraq and commit to assist the Government of Iraq through political and economic reform, capacity-building, and providing conditions for sustainable development, in this context welcoming the decision of the Paris Club, and call on all States to move forward in addressing Iraq's foreign debt burden.
16. Welcome the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, Staffan de Mistura; support the efforts of the United Nations under Security Council resolution 1770 (2007); and recognize UNAMI's key role, at the request of the Government of Iraq, in assisting and supporting Iraq in promoting national reconciliation and regional dialogue, facilitating elections, implementing constitutional provisions, protecting internally displaced persons and refugees, providing humanitarian relief, and resolving disputed internal boundaries.
17. Urge the maintaining or opening of diplomatic missions in Iraq in an effort to improve bilateral relations.
18. Condemn all acts of terrorism in all its forms in Iraq, call for the immediate cessation of all such acts, support the Iraqi Government's increasing efforts in combating terrorism including all efforts to prevent Iraqi territory from being used as a base for terrorism against neighbouring countries, and take note of the bilateral arrangements concluded between Iraq and neighbouring countries regarding the fight against terrorism.
19. Reaffirm the obligations of all States, in accordance with international law, relevant international agreements, Security Council resolution 1546 (2004) and other relevant resolutions, to combat terrorist activities and prevent the use by terrorists of their territory for supplying, organizing, and launching terrorist operations.
20. Support the joint efforts of Iraq and its neighbouring countries to prevent the transit of terrorists and illegal arms to and from Iraq, re-emphasize the importance of strengthening cooperation between Iraq and its neighbouring countries to control their common borders and prevent all kinds of illicit trafficking, including financial, logistical and all other support for terrorists and terrorist organizations; and reject all use of language that encourages violence and terror.
21. Reconfirm the decisions of the neighbouring countries interior ministers meetings and welcome the conclusions of the last neighbouring countries interior ministers meeting which took place in Kuwait on 23 October 2007.
22. Commend Iraq's neighbours, Egypt and Bahrain for their continued efforts to help Iraq achieve stability, security, unity, and territorial integrity; and underline the importance of the involvement of the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference in

supporting the Iraqi reconciliation process; in this context, reaffirm support for the initiative of the League of Arab States to achieve Iraqi national reconciliation and dialogue, and welcome the initiative of OIC to convene the follow-up meeting of the Mecca Declaration.

23. Take note of the proposal of the Iraqi Council of Representatives to convene a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committees of the neighbouring countries' parliaments next year, to promote an improved political atmosphere and enhance common understanding in order to fulfil the tasks agreed upon at the expanded neighbouring countries conference.

The participants expressed their appreciation to the Republic of Turkey for hosting the conference, and also agreed to hold the next ministerial meeting in Kuwait.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
16 November 2007

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and relevant statements of its President, including resolutions 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995, 1088 (1996) of 12 December 1996, 1423 (2002) of 12 July 2002, 1491 (2003) of 11 July 2003, 1551 (2004) of 9 July 2004, 1575 (2004) of 22 November 2004, 1639 (2005) of 21 November 2005, 1722 (2006) of 21 November 2006 and 1764 (2007) of 29 June 2007,

Reaffirming its commitment to the political settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States there within their internationally recognized borders,

Emphasizing its full support for the High Representative's continued role in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Underlining its commitment to support the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (collectively the Peace Agreement, S/1995/999, annex), as well as the relevant decisions of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC),

Recalling all the agreements concerning the status of forces referred to in Appendix B to Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, and reminding the parties of their obligation to continue to comply therewith,

Further recalling the provisions of its resolution 1551 (2004) concerning the provisional application of the status of forces agreements contained in Appendix B to Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement,

Emphasizing its appreciation to the High Representative, the Commander and personnel of the multinational stabilization force (EUFOR), the Senior Military Representative and personnel of the NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the personnel of other international organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for their contributions to the implementation of the Peace Agreement,

Emphasizing that a comprehensive and coordinated return of refugees and displaced persons throughout the region continues to be crucial to lasting peace,

Recalling the declarations of the Ministerial meetings of the Peace Implementation Conference,



Recognizing that full implementation of the Peace Agreement is not yet complete, while *paying tribute* to the achievements of the authorities at State and entity level in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the international community in the twelve years since the signing of the Peace Agreement,

Emphasizing the importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration on the basis of the Peace Agreement, while *recognizing* the importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina's transition to a functional, reform-oriented, modern and democratic European country,

Noting the reports of the High Representative, including his latest report of 5 November 2007 (S/2007/651, annex),

Determined to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994 and the statement of its President on 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/4),

Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

Taking note of the conclusions of EU Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Defence at their joint meeting on 14 May 2007, which reiterate that the EU would retain a military presence in the country as long as necessary, in order to continue contributing to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment,

Recalling the letters between the European Union and NATO sent to the Security Council on 19 November 2004 on how those organizations will cooperate together in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which both organizations recognize that the EUFOR will have the main peace stabilization role under the military aspects of the Peace Agreement (S/2004/916; S/2004/915),

Further recalling the confirmation by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its constituent entities, of the arrangements for EUFOR and the NATO Headquarters presence (S/2004/917),

Welcoming the European Union's increased engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the continued engagement of NATO,

Noting that Bosnia and Herzegovina has made very limited progress towards the European Union, and, in particular, towards the conclusion of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) despite the fact that the text of the SAA has been finalized, and *reiterating its call* on the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement in full their undertakings as also confirmed by the PIC declaration of 31 October 2007,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* once again its support for the Peace Agreement, as well as for the Dayton Paris Agreement on implementing the Federation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina of 10 November 1995 (S/1995/1021, annex) and *calls upon* the parties to comply strictly with their obligations under those Agreements;

2. *Reiterates* that the primary responsibility for the further successful implementation of the Peace Agreement lies with the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves and that the continued willingness of the international community and major donors to assume the political, military and economic burden of implementation and reconstruction efforts will be determined by the compliance and active participation by all the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in implementing the Peace Agreement and rebuilding a civil society, in particular in full cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in strengthening joint institutions, which foster the building of a fully functioning self-sustaining State, able to integrate itself into the European structures and in facilitating returns of refugees and displaced persons;

3. *Reminds* the parties once again that, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, they have committed themselves to cooperate fully with all entities involved in the implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the Peace Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as it carries out its responsibilities for dispensing justice impartially, and *underlines* that full cooperation by States and entities with the International Tribunal includes, inter alia, the surrender for trial or apprehension of all persons indicted by the Tribunal and provision of information to assist in Tribunal investigations;

4. *Emphasizes* its full support for the continued role of the High Representative in monitoring the implementation of the Peace Agreement and giving guidance to and coordinating the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies involved in assisting the parties to implement the Peace Agreement, and *reaffirms* that under Annex 10 of the Peace Agreement the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding the interpretation of civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement and that in case of dispute he may give his interpretation and make recommendations, and make binding decisions as he judges necessary on issues as elaborated by the Peace Implementation Council in Bonn on 9 and 10 December 1997;

5. *Expresses* its support for the declarations of the Ministerial meetings of the Peace Implementation Conference;

6. *Reaffirms* its intention to keep implementation of the Peace Agreement and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina under close review, taking into account the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs 18 and 21 below, and any recommendations those reports might include, and its readiness to consider the imposition of measures if any party fails significantly to meet its obligations under the Peace Agreement;

7. *Recalls* the support of the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the EU force and the continued NATO presence and their confirmation that both are the legal successors to SFOR for the fulfilment of their missions for the purposes of the Peace Agreement, its Annexes and Appendices and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and can take such actions as are required, including the use of force, to ensure compliance with Annexes 1-A and 2 of the Peace Agreement and relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;

8. *Pays tribute* to those Member States which participated in the multinational stabilization force (EUFOR), and in the continued NATO presence, established in accordance with its resolution 1575 (2004) and extended with its resolutions 1639 (2005) and 1722 (2006), and *welcomes* their willingness to assist the Parties to the Peace Agreement by continuing to deploy a multinational stabilization force (EUFOR) and by maintaining a continued NATO presence;

9. *Welcomes* the EU's intention to maintain an EU military operation to Bosnia and Herzegovina from November 2007;

10. *Authorizes* the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the EU to establish for a further period of twelve months, starting from the date of the adoption of this resolution, a multinational stabilization force (EUFOR) as a legal successor to SFOR under unified command and control, which will fulfil its missions in relation to the implementation of Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement in cooperation with the NATO Headquarters presence in accordance with the arrangements agreed between NATO and the EU as communicated to the Security Council in their letters of 19 November 2004, which recognize that the EUFOR will have the main peace stabilization role under the military aspects of the Peace Agreement;

11. *Welcomes* the decision of NATO to continue to maintain a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form of a NATO Headquarters in order to continue to assist in implementing the Peace Agreement in conjunction with EUFOR and *authorizes* the Member States acting through or in cooperation with NATO to continue to maintain a NATO Headquarters as a legal successor to SFOR under unified command and control, which will fulfil its missions in relation to the implementation of Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement in cooperation with EUFOR in accordance with the arrangements agreed between NATO and the EU as communicated to the Security Council in their letters of 19 November 2004, which recognize that EUFOR will have the main peace stabilization role under the military aspects of the Peace Agreement;

12. *Reaffirms* that the Peace Agreement and the provisions of its previous relevant resolutions shall apply to and in respect of both EUFOR and the NATO presence as they have applied to and in respect of SFOR and that therefore references in the Peace Agreement, in particular in Annex 1-A and its appendices, and relevant resolutions to IFOR and/or SFOR, NATO and the NAC shall be read as applying, as appropriate, to the NATO presence, EUFOR, the European Union and the Political and Security Committee and Council of the European Union respectively;

13. *Expresses* its intention to consider the terms of further authorization as necessary in the light of developments in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

14. *Authorizes* the Member States acting under paragraphs 10 and 11 above to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annexes 1-A and 2 of the Peace Agreement, *stresses* that the parties shall continue to be held equally responsible for the compliance with that Annex and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR and the NATO presence as may be necessary to ensure implementation of those Annexes and the protection of EUFOR and the NATO presence;

15. *Authorizes* Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of either EUFOR or the NATO Headquarters, in defence of the EUFOR or NATO presence respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out their missions, and *recognizes* the right of both EUFOR and the NATO presence to take all necessary measures to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack;

16. *Authorizes* the Member States acting under paragraphs 10 and 11 above, in accordance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules and procedures governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all civilian and military air traffic;

17. *Demands* that the parties respect the security and freedom of movement of EUFOR, the NATO presence and other international personnel;

18. *Requests* the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the EU and the Member States acting through or in cooperation with NATO to report to the Council on the activity of EUFOR and NATO Headquarters presence respectively, through the appropriate channels and at least at three-monthly intervals;

19. *Invites* all States, in particular those in the region, to continue to *provide* appropriate support and facilities, including transit facilities, for the Member States acting under paragraphs 10 and 11 above;

20. *Reiterates its appreciation for* the deployment by the EU of its Police Mission (EUPM) to Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1 January 2003;

21. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to continue to submit to the Council reports from the High Representative, in accordance with Annex 10 of the Peace Agreement and the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in London on 4 and 5 December 1996 (S/1996/1012), and later Peace Implementation Conferences, on the implementation of the Peace Agreement and in particular on compliance by the parties with their commitments under that Agreement;

22. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.



Security Council

Distr.: General
20 November 2007

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

Following consultations among the members of the Security Council, the members agreed to elect the Chairman of the following subsidiary body for the period ending 31 December 2007:

Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa

Luc Joseph Okio (Congo)



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
20 November 2007

Original: English

**Letter dated 19 November 2007 from the Chairman of the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the
President of the Security Council**

Annexed hereto is the work programme for the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), which covers the period from 1 July to 31 December 2007 (see annex).

The activities of the Committee will proceed in compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1535 (2004), 1566 (2004) and 1624 (2005).

The Committee will continue to monitor Member States' implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), guided by the principles of cooperation, transparency, equal treatment and consistency in approach. The Committee will remain focused on promoting States' implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and on taking practical measures designed to enhance the counter-terrorism capacity of States. In addition, the Committee will report to the Council on how States have implemented resolution 1624 (2005).

The Counter-Terrorism Committee welcomes the support it has received from the Member States, the United Nations Secretariat and international, regional and subregional organizations and appreciates the contribution by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ricardo Alberto Arias
Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism



Annex**Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee for the period 1 July to 31 December 2007****Introduction**

1. In accordance with resolution 1373 (2001), the Counter-Terrorism Committee has as its mandate to promote and monitor States' implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).

2. In December 2006, the Security Council undertook the comprehensive review of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate in accordance with its decision of 21 December 2005 (see S/PRST/2005/64). The Council endorsed the Counter-Terrorism Committee's review report (S/2006/989) which, together with the statement by the President of the Security Council of 20 December 2006 (S/PRST/2006/56), provided guidance for the future work of the Committee and the Executive Directorate, in particular the following:

- The guiding principles of the work of the Committee are cooperation, transparency and even-handedness, as well as consistency in approach.
- The Committee shall continue to strengthen its relations with international, regional and subregional organizations in promoting and assisting States in the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).
- The Committee shall work on identifying and promoting best practices in all key areas of resolution 1373 (2001).
- The Committee shall ensure that any measures taken by States to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.
- The Committee shall attach great importance to coordination with experts from other counter-terrorism-related Security Council subsidiary bodies in preparing visits and in streamlining reporting.
- The Committee shall play its part in the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (General Assembly resolution 60/288).
- In the fulfilment of its mandate, the Committee is assisted by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, under the policy guidance of the Plenary. In this regard, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate will implement the policy guidance of the Committee through its seventh work programme (see appendix).

3. The Committee will focus its work on the three priority objectives below:

Monitoring and promoting the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001)

4. The Committee, on the basis of initial assessments by its subcommittees, will continue to consider the preliminary implementation assessments and approve, where appropriate, recommendations prepared by the Executive Directorate and send them to all Member States concerned for appropriate action, in accordance

with the procedures for the Counter-Terrorism Committee's updated working methods.

5. On the basis of the global analysis prepared by the Executive Directorate, the Committee will consider the status of implementation by all States of resolution 1373 (2001), including detected gaps of particular concern, and elaborate possible additional measures to enhance implementation. Subsequently, the Committee will brief the Security Council on the results of its consideration of this item.

6. In addition, at the end of the year, on the basis of an updated and further detailed analysis prepared by the Executive Directorate, the Committee will reassess the status of implementation by all States of resolution 1373 (2001). This assessment will assist the Committee in preparing a more focused workplan for 2008. The Committee will report to the Security Council on the status of the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).

7. The Committee will begin discussion on a proposal for a technical guide to resolution 1373 (2001), to be prepared by the Executive Directorate, that would set out the requirements and necessary steps for implementing the provisions of the resolution and the standards for measuring States' implementation of the resolution.

8. In close cooperation with the 1267 (1999) and 1540 (2004) Committees and consistent with its mandate, the Committee will pay special attention to those States which are late in submitting relevant information to it and discuss how best to address the issue.

9. The Committee will also continue to reflect on additional ways to address the case of States that do not meet the requirements of resolution 1373 (2001).

10. The Committee will continue discussions and take steps to ensure that visits to States upon their consent lead to enhancing the States' implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and assess the results of such visits and consider proper follow-up. Furthermore, the Committee will consider a discussion on updating the current framework document, drawing on lessons learned and focusing on the selection of countries to visit, and the preparation and follow-up to such visits.

11. In order to enhance transparency, the Chairman of the Committee will hold periodic informal briefings, as appropriate, for Member States on the work of the Committee.

Facilitating technical assistance to States in a twofold and proactive way

12. The Committee will complete preparation of its fifth special meeting with international, regional and subregional organizations.

13. The Committee will conduct thematic discussions on strengthening efforts to limit terrorists' mobility with the participation of experts from all of the relevant technical international organizations before the fifth special meeting.

14. The Committee will further develop the practice of holding informal forums targeting present and potential donors/providers in order to strengthen relations with the donor community.

Maintaining dialogue with States on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005)

15. On the basis of reports from Member States, the Committee will report to the Council on how States have implemented resolution 1624 (2005). Furthermore, the Committee will continue to encourage States that have still not reported on their implementation of resolution 1624 (2005) to do so.

16. On the basis of the reports received so far from States and of the information gathered during visits, the Committee will initiate a discussion to explore the needs of States for technical assistance in the implementation of resolution 1624 (2005) and will aim to facilitate the provision of such assistance as appropriate.

Appendix

Work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate for the period 1 July to 31 December 2007

Introduction

1. The present document sets out the seventh work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2007. It was prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of the report of the Committee on its revitalization (S/2004/124) and takes into account the additional tasks assigned to the Executive Directorate by the Committee in its review report (S/2006/989) and the twenty-second work programme of the Committee. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in achieving concrete results in the areas defined in its work programme and will respond to any additional requests made during the reporting period.

Monitoring and promoting the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001)

2. The Executive Directorate will continue to assist the Committee and the subcommittees in the consideration and approval of the preliminary implementation assessments.

3. The Executive Directorate will prepare a proposal for a technical guide to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) that would set out the requirements and steps for implementing the provisions of the resolution.

4. In addition, by the end of 2007, the Executive Directorate will prepare an updated, detailed analysis of the status of implementation by all States of resolution 1373 (2001) in order to assist the Committee in its work.

5. In close cooperation with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, the Executive Directorate will prepare and conduct visits to some of the Member States that have been approved by the Committee. It will enhance its cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Action Group, relevant United Nations bodies, including the Monitoring Team of the 1267 (1999) Committee and the Expert Group of the 1540 (2004) Committee, other international organizations, and regional and subregional organizations, in the context of the Committee's visits.

6. The Executive Directorate will continue to update the Committee regularly on follow-up to its previous visits to Member States.

7. The Executive Directorate will report regularly to the Committee on implementation of the common strategy for non-reporting/late reporting States prepared together with the two expert teams of the counter-terrorism-related Security Council subsidiary bodies.

8. The Executive Directorate, in cooperation with the two expert teams and the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime will organize a workshop for Central and Western African countries on the drafting of reports, scheduled for the end of September 2007 in Dakar. In cooperation with the above partners and the Southern African Development Community, it will organize a workshop for southern African countries, to be held at the end of November 2007 in Gaborone.

Facilitating technical assistance to States

9. The Executive Directorate will continue its work to facilitate technical assistance to States in accordance with the 2007 implementation action plan for fulfilling the Committee's policy guidance on facilitation of technical assistance and will continue to report regularly to the Committee on progress made in this regard.

10. The Executive Directorate will complete by December 2007 the technical assistance matrix posted on the website to include all the relevant subregions of the world in need of assistance. The Executive Directorate will establish a password protection system for access to different parts of the matrix. The directory of assistance by donors/providers will also be regularly updated.

11. The Executive Directorate will further develop the practice of holding informal forums targeting present and potential donors/providers, to strengthen relations with the donor community in that regard. The Executive Directorate will organize an informal forum for West African Member States and potential donors and providers in July 2007, and develop a follow-up action plan.

12. The Executive Directorate will continue to work on identifying, posting on the website and actively promoting best practices in all key areas of resolution 1373 (2001), in accordance with the action plan approved by the Committee, and will regularly provide progress reports.

13. Under the guidance of the Committee, the Executive Directorate will organize logistics for the fifth special meeting with international, regional and subregional organizations, to take place from 29 to 31 October 2007 in Nairobi, Kenya, and will seek extrabudgetary financing for the meeting.

14. The Executive Directorate will assist the Committee in the preparation and conduct of thematic discussions on strengthening efforts to limit terrorists' mobility, with the participation of experts from all the relevant technical international organizations, prior to the holding of the Committee's fifth special meeting.

15. The Executive Directorate will enhance cooperation with a number of regional and subregional organizations in Africa and Asia, in particular those prioritized by the Committee, in order to assist them in preparing and/or implementing relevant counter-terrorism action plans and in addressing other capacity-building needs.

Implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005)

16. The Executive Directorate will present, in July 2007, for the Committee's consideration, a second report for the Security Council on implementation of its resolution 1624 (2005), based on responses received from Member States. It will continue including the issue of implementation of resolution 1624 (2005) in its dialogue with States and will actively encourage those States that have not yet submitted a 1624 (2005) report, to do so.

Administrative activities

17. The Executive Directorate will develop a system of maintaining the password protection system to secure the confidentiality of the information provided in the technical assistance matrix posted on the website.

18. The Executive Directorate will undertake the administrative, financial and logistical preparatory work for holding the Committee's fifth special meeting.

19. The Executive Directorate will prepare a budget proposal for the Executive Directorate as a special political mission in 2008, without prejudice to a future decision by the Security Council to extend its mandate. The budget will provide resources for the conduct of all mandated activities in accordance with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. In particular, the budget will provide for completion of all visits of the Executive Directorate to those Member States approved by the Committee in 2006 and not visited in 2007. In addition, the Executive Directorate will seek financing necessary to conduct two informal meetings with donors/providers and regional Member States seeking technical assistance. In accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations the Executive Directorate will also prepare logical frameworks to accompany its budget submission, in conformity with results-based budgeting, to ensure that programmatic aspects of the budget and the resources requested are consistent with its mandates from the Security Council and the General Assembly. The budget proposal will be open to amendment until the General Assembly begins its consideration of a budget resolution for 2008 in its Fifth Committee. Any decisions of the Security Council or of the Committee that may be taken after adoption of the budget for the Executive Directorate that have budgetary implications could be presented to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and subsequently submitted to a resumed session of the Fifth Committee in March 2008.

Other activities

20. Under the guidance of the Committee, the Executive Directorate will fulfil its mandate in conformity with that of the Security Council and its Committee to implement the relevant parts of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (General Assembly resolution 60/288). In this context, it will continue to participate in the work of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

21. The Executive Directorate will prepare its sixth semi-annual report for the Committee, covering the period of this work programme.

22. The Executive Directorate will continue to inform the Committee about its work on a monthly basis, in accordance with the report of the Committee on its revitalization (S/2004/124).

23. The Executive Directorate will continue to ensure follow-up to the Committee's decisions and to implement them.

24. The Executive Directorate will continue to implement the communications strategy approved by the Committee and will adjust the implementation plan, when appropriate, as well as report on progress made in meeting its expected goals.